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## **Arms Control**

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# Arms Control

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**Army Paper Praises Paris CW Conference Results, Urges CW World Ban**

*HK2401071389 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO  
in Chinese 15 Jan 89 p 4*

["Weekly Commentary" by Yu Zhongzhou: "Dual Strategic Measures Must Be Adopted To Eliminate Chemical Weapons"]

[Text] The 5-day international conference on banning chemical weapons in Paris concluded on the afternoon of 11 January. Representatives from 149 countries and regions attended this conference, and foreign ministers led the delegations of over 80 countries. From the time the proposal to open this conference was put forward it took merely 2 months to prepare such a large-scale and high-level international conference, and this reflected the ardent desires of the international community for banning chemical weapons.

The most important result of this international conference was its Final Declaration passed unanimously by all delegations. The declaration solemnly stated that all countries participating in the conference are determined to eliminate all chemical weapons so as to prevent the use of this type of weapons; they promise not to use chemical weapons and condemn the use of such weapons. The declaration also stressed the need to conclude a treaty at an early date on banning the development, production, storage, and use of all chemical weapons and eliminating such weapons. It was a gratifying event that such substantive results were achieved in the field of international disarmament as soon as the New Year came. However, as foreign news agencies' dispatches pointed out, the participating countries "were still holding different opinions on the concrete steps although they reached general and principled agreement" on the issue of banning chemical weapons. This state of affairs shows that it is necessary to adopt some dual strategic measures in this respect.

First, it is necessary to ban strictly the development and production of new chemical weapons, while the countries concerned begin to eliminate thoroughly all their existing chemical weapons and production facilities and promise not to use chemical weapons. In recent years chemical weapons were used from time to time in some regional conflicts, causing serious casualties. This also evoked strong condemnation from international opinion. However, some advanced industrial countries still made use of modern technology to develop new chemical weapons, and some new toxicants with high toxicity will soon be produced, seriously threatening mankind. People should maintain high vigilance over this. If these countries just reduce out-of-date chemical weapons and continue to develop new weapons with a higher killing

capacity, then the vicious cycle in the arms race related to chemical weapons will not be broken. Then, how could there be security in the world?

Now, who possess the largest chemical arsenals and are most energetically engaged in the chemical arms race in the world? They are certainly the two superpowers. According to some foreign experts' estimates, the stock of chemical weapons kept by the United States and the Soviet Union reaches more than 100,000 tons or even several hundred thousand tons. They also possess the most advanced technology to produce toxicants. Therefore, the second dual strategic measure for banning chemical weapons is to prohibit any country from monopolizing advanced chemical weapons and especially to demand that the two superpowers take the lead in stopping the development, production, and transfer of chemical weapons and eliminate their existing chemical weapons as soon as possible, while measures are taken to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons and prevent the appearance of new chemical producing countries. At the Paris international conference the Soviet Union announced that it will begin to destroy its chemical weapons in stock in 1989 and is willing to accept international supervision. For this, people will still have to wait and see the concrete actions taken by the Soviet Union, and demand that it discontinue production of any new chemical weapons. The Soviet Union has already expressed its attitude, but what will the United States do? Although the United States has also destroyed some of its obsolete chemical weapons, it still takes the chemical weapons as a component part of its military strength and a major "military deterrence." If the United States is sincere about chemical disarmament, it should also take concrete actions.

As the third dual strategic measure, efforts should be made to eliminate various unstable factors that may lead to the proliferation of chemical weapons and the intensification of the chemical arms race, while all countries concerned are stepping up their talks on eliminating chemical weapons. Since the Geneva Convention was concluded in 1925, chemical weapons have not been effectively banned over the past more than 60 years, and the root cause was war and unrest. At present, the international situation is changing from a tense one to a relaxed one, and this provides a propitious time for eliminating chemical weapons. All countries concerned should grasp this opportunity and try to conclude an international treaty on banning all chemical weapons as soon as possible so as to advance the international situation in the orientation of peace and development.

The Paris conference did achieve positive results. However, as in other fields of international disarmament, the process of eliminating chemical weapons will not be smooth. Painstaking efforts will have to be made in order to realize the Final Declaration's objective.

## ALBANIA

### 'Limits' of U.S.-Soviet 'Strategic Equilibrium' Viewed

AU0901144389 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT  
in Albanian 30 Dec 88 p 4

[Arben Karapici article: "The 'Limits' of American-Soviet Strategic Equilibrium"]

[Text] The emergence of the phase of agreement in which American-Soviet relations find themselves today has brought to the fore the familiar idea of maintaining strategic equilibrium between the United States and the Soviet Union. The two superpowers seek to justify their strategic advancement, from armaments down to intervention in different areas of the world, with the "equilibrium" theory, and they broadcast the practical steps they have been taking in political and military matters as efforts to maintain this equilibrium. As one of the favorite theories in the superpowers' present-day theoretical armory of politics and diplomacy, the equilibrium theory is being preached by the United States and the USSR as a need of both for each other and for the calculations to which they subject each other's capabilities. Gorbachev considers the present equilibrium between the United States and the USSR as a "principal factor in preserving peace in the world," while George Bush, who will officially take up the post of American president in January next year, has recently asserted that "world peace is a result of bilateral agreements to preserve equilibrium in every field."

Therefore, both sides put forward equilibrium as "the key to success," but what are the limits of equilibrium between the United States and the USSR? Let us take the specific issue of the removal of intermediate-range missiles from Europe. This process, of course, is a positive step in the direction of the disarmament that sovereign states and peoples everywhere in the world so much desire. But the question of American-Soviet strategic equilibrium in Europe through the removal of Euromissiles has produced a new problem, that of the tactical missiles that both superpowers possess on our continent. The United States continues to insist on "the geographical proximity of the Soviet Union to Europe," which, according to them, gives rise to imbalance. In order to cope with this, they plan to send large contingents of tactical nuclear weapons and other nuclear and conventional arms to Europe at the same time as they dismantle intermediate-range missiles. The special White House envoy, William Taft, forcefully put forward this project for the acceptance of the Western European allies during a recent European tour. In response to this American step, Marshal Kulikov, the chief of General Staff of the Warsaw Pact military forces, stated that "We will not permit the United States and NATO to destroy the military equilibrium of forces and to achieve military superiority." This means that the Soviet Union, for its part, will undertake all the necessary measures that Moscow considers to be a "response," and which involve

a fresh spiral in the arms race of the two blocs. Apart from this, the Soviet Union seeks to include the nuclear arsenals of Britain and France, as NATO member states, in the general equilibrium between the two blocs. If we add to this the fact that between the United States and the Soviet Union, it becomes clear that Europe and the world are still a long way from full and genuine steps toward disarmament. [sentence as published]

It must be said that the "equilibrium," whose preservation both sides seek, does not rely only on armament or disarmament, because the balance of strength, as both the Americans and the Soviets call it, is a fundamental component of their equilibrium theory. The newspaper PRAVDA recently wrote, "Our attitude to current world problems considers a broad equilibrium of interests that implies, first of all, an equilibrium with American interests wherever they emerge or exist." It thus becomes obvious that American-Soviet strategic equilibrium, with all its military and political ingredients, has as its core the superpowers' interests in hegemony and domination. Thus, preserving equilibrium between the United States and the Soviet Union presupposes that no side will exceed the other either in military strength or in their respective zones of political and economic influence.

At present, when the two superpowers are making the solution of regional conflicts in the Middle East, southern Africa, Central America, and elsewhere the object of intensive discussion, their main worry is what future the solution of these conflicts will bring to American and Soviet interests in the relevant regions. This concern was openly voiced in the recent Geneva talks between Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Adamishin and his American counterpart Crocker in relation to the problems of Angola and Namibian independence, when both sides stressed that "an agreement must be reached," that also takes into account the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union in the region. Thus, a mutual recognition of each other's interests, sanctioned by official documents exchanged between the superpowers, is an inseparable element in the theory of maintaining American-Soviet equilibrium in every area and at all costs.

Whatever aspect one considers, preserving equilibrium serves the preservation of the hegemonistic interests of the superpowers in international relations and the increase of their domination to the level of an inevitable norm in world political life.

In the present situation, when the peoples of the entire world are determinedly calling for real achievements in disarmament and for solutions to conflicts wherever they may exist, in accordance with their freedom-loving aspirations for self-determination, the superpowers are trying to persuade peoples and states that nobody can live

outside the sphere that includes "the equilibrium of strategic interests" of the Americans and the Soviets. The United States and the Soviet Union consider the solution of the most important issues in modern international life to be exclusively within the competence of their interests. It is a superpower attitude that minimizes, to the point of total disregard, the role of other states in solving the most essential problems that preoccupy the entire international community.

As a European country that has always strongly opposed the tendency of the superpowers to monopolize world affairs and to use their diktat in international relations; which has raised its voice loudly; and which struggles for security, a reduction of tension, and for true peace throughout the world; Socialist Albania is in favor of the irreplaceable role of the international community, in which all countries decide together the important issues that determine the destiny of the peoples and mankind, such as peace and genuine international security.

## INDIA

### Commentary Views Indian 'Action Plan' on Nuclear Disarmament

52500017 Calcutta *THE STATESMAN* in English  
30 Nov, 1 Dec 88

[30 Nov 88 p 8]

[First of two part article by Amalendu Das Gupta: "End To N-Arms?—I"]

[Text] Nuclear disarmament was not the most pressing issue that Mikhail Gorbachev and Rajiv Gandhi discussed at their recent meeting in Delhi, but it figured prominently in their joint statement. Aspects of it were also mentioned in other contexts. References to the Delhi Declaration of November 1986 were obligatory ritual, reflecting continuing satisfaction at an identity of long-term goals. Now that India, too, has outlined a "time-bound" programme for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, Delhi's position may seem closer to Moscow's. But the immediate interests are not identical; hence the failure to go beyond a statement of general aims.

For India it is necessary, though not easy, to show how its national concerns and resulting policies conform to its global vision. On the one hand, its commitment to a "nuclear weapon-free and non-violent world" must be seen to be unwavering; on the other, its refusal to surrender its nuclear weapon option by signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) must not be seen to be in conflict with this goal. This calls for a subtle conceptual balance, which has in fact been unobtrusively incorporated in a series of disarmament formulations.

#### Common Ground

These formulations were presented with some persuasiveness at an international conference held in New Delhi immediately before the Gorbachov visit. The event, designed to mark the start of the Nehru centenary celebrations and perhaps also to define the framework of the related talks with the Russians, reaffirmed India's adherence to the Delhi Declaration, and thereby highlighted the celebrated common ground, by declaring its theme to be "Towards a Nuclear Weapon-Free and Non-Violent World". It was also intended to remind others, especially India's neighbours and other Third World countries, that Delhi was seriously pursuing a goal that many might dismiss as too idealistic. Foreign participation was fairly large and distinguished; even China was represented, though not Pakistan. The deliberations, however, were more interesting in the light they threw on certain divergent perceptions.

A central document before the conference was an "action plan for ushering in a nuclear weapon-free and non-violent world order" that India had tabled at the UN General Assembly special session on disarmament

in June this year. The plan, though more detailed than Mr Gorbachov's proposal in January 1986 for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of this century, had not attracted much attention; it may not be taken very seriously even now. But it remains important from the Indian point of view, for it outlines how total nuclear disarmament, to be brought about by a three-stage process ending in the year 2010, must be the responsibility of the nuclear weapon powers rather than of countries being urged to keep away from the path to nuclear weaponry. A primary requirement would be to replace the NPT by a new treaty to eliminate all nuclear weapons by 2010.

As India has been arguing at different international fora, the NPT is not merely unequal and discriminatory in character; by validating the present possession of nuclear weapons by a few powers it stands in the way of efforts for nuclear disarmament. India has also explained that it is not seeking for non-nuclear weapon states the right to acquire such weapons; the treaty it has in mind would not merely oblige nuclear weapon powers to get rid of their arsenals but also require non-nuclear weapon states not to cross the n-arms threshold. These would be simultaneous undertakings. But even the Soviet Union has not been persuaded that the NPT can be dispensed with; the Soviet delegate to the New Delhi conference described the NPT as "one of the cornerstones of a transition to security in the nuclear area and a kind of portent for a future non-nuclear world". Indeed he asked: "Isn't it so that non-proliferation of the most destructive weapons in the world—nuclear weapons—is the first step towards non-violence?"

That the first, or at least a simultaneous, step should be a commitment to eliminate these weapons altogether is, apparently, no more convincing to the Russians than it is to the USA, though the Soviet Union does support the Indian plea for an international convention prohibiting the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons. Again, Soviet support for the idea of nuclear-free zones does not reflect full appreciation of Indian reservations about their "viability" and "credibility" in specific situations. At the United Nations Pakistan and its allies have repeatedly tried to show the Indian position to be inconsistent. A recommendation made at the New Delhi conference could be translated into an intelligent diplomatic move by India to put some of its critics on the defensive.

#### Treaty Proposal

The conference recommended that China, India and the USSR could sign a treaty in Asia to ban the use and threat of use of nuclear capabilities against parties to such a treaty, which could later be opened for signature by other Asian countries. There should be no objection since China and the Soviet Union have already proclaimed the doctrine of "no first use" of nuclear weapons and since almost all Asian nations have voted in favour

of banning the use and threat of these weapons. The proposal can be more actively pursued in the context of the talks Mr Gandhi and Mr Gorbachov expect to hold with Chinese leaders.

The conference took note of the debate on whether the ultimate goal should be a totally nuclear weapon-free world or a world where security is safeguarded by minimal nuclear deterrence. Many in the West regard total elimination as an impracticable goal, and argue that what is worth considering is a substantially "less nuclear" rather than a "nuclear-free" world. The reductions that the Western governments seem prepared to examine would do little to free the world from nuclear terror, and some in the West have argued that security can be ensured by as little as five per cent, or even less, of the existing nuclear arsenals. But India has been attacking the very concept of nuclear deterrence, which it says provides the rationale of the NPT. Its plea is for the formulation and acceptance of totally different security doctrines.

Formally the Soviet Union, too, is committed to total abolition of nuclear arms and the establishment of international security on an entirely different basis. But it is doubtful whether the Russians really regard this as an attainable ideal in the foreseeable future. True, Mr Gorbachov has warned: "If we start orienting ourselves to a 'minimal' nuclear deterrence now, I assure you that nuclear weapons will start spreading around the world." This supports the Indian argument that deterrence has become another excuse for continuing the arms race; but clearly what Mr Gorbachov has in mind is the replacement, in the name of drastic reductions, of existing arsenals by fewer but vastly superior weapons. With all his ringing rhetoric about a nuclear weapon-free world, the Russians devote serious attention only to possibilities and plans for reduction.

#### Kremlin Study

According to a paper prepared for the New Delhi conference by an MIT analyst. Soviet defence experts have privately circulated in the West a study indicating that Moscow would be satisfied with a strategic nuclear arsenal of 600 single-warhead land-based missiles if the USA agreed to reduce its strategic arsenal to the same number—as against a ceiling on each side of 1,600 delivery vehicles and 6,000 warheads contemplated under a strategic arms reduction treaty. This shows that the Soviet Union is prepared to go much beyond the 50 per cent reduction now being negotiated; it is also conceivable that it will not insist on keeping a strategic arsenal of 600 missiles and warheads for all time to come. But the point to note is that they have not really dismissed the idea of minimal deterrence as unworthy of consideration.

The Indian approach may seem unrealistic; but it is not that Delhi has no idea of what is or will be involved. Its rejection of even minimal deterrence arises from its

concern that the doctrines underlying the present nuclear disarmament efforts may give a sanction to the discriminatory nuclear non-proliferation regime. Soviet and Indian interests do converge up to a point, not merely in underlining the primary of nuclear disarmament but also in pressing for such specific measures as a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and a declaration delegitimizing the use or threat of nuclear weapons. But a nuclear superpower which will remain a superpower and a country possessing a near-nuclear capability which it is unwilling to renounce cannot but have different perceptions and priorities. Any change in the Soviet view may now only be to find a closer understanding with the other superpower.

[1 Dec 88 p 8]

[Second of two part article by Amalendu Das Gupta:  
"End To N-Arms?—II"]

[Text] It is not difficult to see, and endorse, the calculation behind Delhi's insistence that nothing short of total abolition of nuclear weapons is worth striving for. Yet it is the high moral premises that invite general attention, which explains the unreality of much of the resulting discourse. There is arguably a danger of the central issues being obscured by tardy efforts to reduce the existing arsenals and more energetic action to prevent the emergence of new ones; but surely all one can hope for is progressive reduction. Even the Indian action plan envisages elimination by stages, however sharp the contemplated transitions from one stage to another. So what is discussed today should have some relation to what the next step can be.

#### Momentum

The New Delhi conference, it was stated, would help in building an "irreversible momentum" for the nuclear disarmament process in the post-INF treaty period, it being further assumed that the treaty had opened up the possibility of a nuclear weapon-free world. But both the significance of the treaty and its impact on further disarmament plans have often been greatly exaggerated, both by an uncritical public and by official propagandists trying to lull the public into complacency and inaction. The point was not missed in the New Delhi deliberations, but it was not allowed to dim the idealistic vision of a new world order.

The INF treaty provided for the elimination of no more than three to four per cent of the world nuclear stockpile. And elimination, it must be noted, means dismantling rather than destruction. The missiles will be destroyed, but not the nuclear warheads, which can possibly be readjusted for other weapons. Proposals for the modernization of the NATO nuclear forces have gained greater urgency since the signing of the INF treaty. And it is well to remember that after the INF missiles are gone, the world will still have a total of more than 50,000 nuclear weapons (warheads), some 24,500 of which belong to the strategic arsenals of the two superpowers.



The immediate interest now is in a 50 per cent reduction in these strategic weapons. Even that would leave the two nations with 20 per cent more strategic warheads than in 1972 when the SALT I and ABM agreements were signed. Yet a 50 per cent cut under a strategic arms reduction treaty would be the first major step in nuclear disarmament; plans for freeing the world from the horrendous overkill capacity, let alone all nuclear arms, can be seriously considered only after this step is taken. The outlook, unfortunately, has not improved in the year since the treaty was signed.

The joint statement at the end of the Washington summit in December last year said that the two sides would work to complete a strategic arms reduction agreement "at the earliest possible date, preferably in time for signature at the next (summit) meeting". But with a few months the Americans were insisting that no deadline had been set. After the Moscow summit Mr Gorbachov remarked ruefully on a "missed opportunity", but the opportunity had disappeared earlier when Washington had decided to slow down the momentum generated at the third summit. Even liberal American politicians warned Mr Reagan against "moving too fast". There was still some talk of a treaty by the end of this year, only to be firmly discouraged by American officials as the United States prepared for the change in the White House.

The prospect has further receded, President Reagan told the UN General Assembly on September 26 that "it is highly doubtful such a treaty can be accomplished in a few months", though he thought it should be possible in a year's time. This can be partly explained by the uncertainties and policy adjustments involved in the changeover in Washington. Even if a broad policy continuity is maintained, the Bush presidency may, at least initially, see greater merit in pragmatic caution, and the psychological climate for radical change may be further dissipated as a result. The differences over the details of strategic arms cuts have been so narrowed down that a treaty can be signed without delay, but the political will in Washington has distinctly weakened.

The will may be further enfeebled by counsel from men like Henry Kissinger and, more important, by pressure from groups with a vested interest in the arms business and in new technologies for war. In a paper for the New Delhi conference Professor George Wald, the distinguished American biologist, pointed out that the Pentagon awards about \$150 billion a year to defence contractors, that about 20 million Americans now make their living in "military activities, whether in the armed forces, their civilian sectors, or in the 'defence' industry". In another paper Professor Carl Sagan estimated that "in current dollars" the USA had spent roughly \$10 trillion on the Cold War since 1945.

### Star Wars

Professor Wald sees a possible chance of nuclear disarmament though. Since nuclear weapons are relatively cheap, and the "conventional" arms business in America

about three times as large as the nuclear, it may be possible to cut nuclear arms production without any serious upset to the defence industry as a whole. But the pressure of technological innovation, which tends to acquire an independent momentum, may be more insidious in non-conventional areas, continuously spurring the development of new weapons. Star Wars is a case in point. As Carl Sagan puts it, the idea is doomed: "SDI is ruinously expensive, it can be overwhelmed, outfoxed, underflown, it's tremendously porous in the best of cases and—far from preventing nuclear war—it is likely to lead to nuclear war". Yet, even if this conclusion is generally accepted, some of the work under the programme will surely be continued, even expanded, as a source of new weapons technologies.

Robert McNamara and Hans Bethe, the Nobel Prize winning physicist who was involved in the development of the first atomic bomb, have remarked: "The 25,000 (nuclear) warheads that each nation (the USA and the USSR) possesses did not come about through any plan but simply descended upon the world as a consequence of continuing technological innovation." Both in the USA and the Soviet Union, a number of new weapons systems are known to be in advanced stages of development. The prospect of such advances is also giving rise to new security doctrines, including that of "discriminate deterrence" with more efficient and precise weapons for surgical strikes. These emerging technologies may make nonsense of even drastic reductions in the existing nuclear arsenals.

### Warnings

Warnings against a new arms race are not, therefore, irrelevant; indeed it may eventually be a cause of greater anxiety to the developing world. But the campaign against nuclear arms can be diluted by too large an extension of its scope. A nuclear weapons-free world will not be a non-violent world; it may not even be more peaceful than the world today. Yet what a nuclear war would mean, and what the nuclear arms build-up has meant so far, makes nuclear disarmament itself an autonomous, if limited, goal. Even in this limited area the agenda is vast and complex, and it may be more fruitful to concentrate on a few immediate aims at a time than to engage in an elaborate debate on the intricate interrelationships that can possibly create and sustain a new world order. Plans for progressive elimination may be complicated by a controversy over whether there should in the end be no nuclear weapons at all or a few as a minimal guarantee of security.

Even some fervent advocates of nuclear disarmament think that a minimal nuclear deterrent will be inescapable, and have carried out studies on how small this minimum can be. One suggestion, for example, is a total of about 3,000 nuclear weapons, with 1,000 each for the two superpowers; another study suggests 700 warheads each for the USA and the USSR; the reported Soviet estimate of 600 has already been mentioned. It does

seem morally offensive that all these calculations are based on the assumption that a few countries will have to retain some nuclear weapons while the rest of the world will be required to forgo any such capability. But the world is nowhere near the reductions which can make this controversy seem particularly relevant; if the U.S.-Soviet strategic stockpile is reduced by half, the world will still be left with a total of some 40,000 nuclear weapons.

The only purpose of the debate at this stage can be to remind the nuclear weapon states that until they make far more drastic cuts and at least consider total abolition, others cannot legitimately be asked to renounce their option. This is the philosophy behind the Indian action plan. Yet the action the plan recommends is likely to be seriously considered only when the immediate aims are more closely related to existing realities, even if the ultimate goal were to remain inviolate.

### **NATO Emphasis on Tank Asymmetry Criticized**

52000004b Moscow *SELSKAYA ZHIZN* in Russian  
11 Jan 89 p 3

[Commentary by Vadim Biryukov: "Actual and Fictitious Imbalances"]

[Text] The new peace initiatives of the Soviet Union, formulated at the end of last year at the UN General Assembly session, met with a broad response in the West. There were plenty of positive assessments of the unilateral steps taken by the Soviet government to reduce Armed Forces and armaments. The readiness of the USSR to make changes in the deployment of its forces was welcomed. Positive responses to Soviet initiatives were also heard in NATO headquarters in Brussels.

However, the North Atlantic Bloc has not stopped there. It is also formulating proposals on lowering the level of military confrontation. Unfortunately, their distinguishing feature is a unilateral approach to the problem of eliminating imbalances and asymmetries. Let us, it claims, reduce only the type of armaments in which the advantage is on the side of the Warsaw Pact. In particular, it is being claimed that the main threat to European stability is created by Soviet tanks, artillery and armored personnel carriers. Therefore, according to the Atlanticists, it is precisely these types of armaments that should be the first to be reduced.

Is this fair? Whereas in terms of tanks the advantage is indeed on the side of the Warsaw Pact, in terms of artillery, for example, it has been artificially created in the West. Western specialists count only artillery weapons of a 100-mm or higher caliber. If we include all artillery, including 75 mm guns and 45 mm mortars, it turns out that NATO's superiority is in the order of 20,000 units. Furthermore, according to published Western data, it is obvious that NATO enjoys superiority in elements of military force such as fighter-bomber and ground-attack aircraft as well as fire support helicopters. Nonetheless, so far NATO circles are not mentioning the need to eliminate this imbalance.

Therefore, the USSR has taken a unilateral initiative aimed at lowering military confrontation in Central Europe. Now it is NATO's turn. However, it would appear that its members are in no hurry to take countersteps, again and again repeating the argument which sets the teeth on edge, of the alleged military superiority of the Warsaw Pact. Meanwhile, the world is awaiting the constructive answer of the Western countries.

### **West German Lays Soviet Troop Cuts to Demographic Problem**

#### **Commentary: 'Forced Measure'**

52000002 Moscow *PRAVDA* in Russian 6 Jan 89 p 6

[Article by Herbert Kremp, DIE WELT analyst: "A Look at the East"]

[Text] The pictures of development in the West and East are displaying deep shadows. Strange phenomena at the time of today's "dawn" of disarmament.

There is fear in the West that NATO may lose its meaning and lose the support of its members under increasing pressure of the unilateral reduction in armed forces announced by M.S. Gorbachev (and his New York speech is not considered the last word). When looking at the East, there is a prevalent opinion that the partial disarmament which the Soviet leader announced is not a chess move in a diplomatic game. Rather, this is a forced measure. The economy is on the verge of collapse. The management system is overloaded and has malfunctioned. The Soviet Union is unable to handle either the normal course of events or a catastrophe (Armenia).

As a result of an in-depth analysis, high-ranking American experts in Brussels (NATO Headquarters is located there—Editor) have come to the following conclusion. M.S. Gorbachev took an important step in New York. It gained him an advantage and respect in the West. However, the unilateral intention has not been made official in any treaty. It can be reversed or changed (for example, under pressure from the military). It is free from verification and therefore should be subjected to additional discussion in Vienna. There was no statement about ending the enormous military production—the conversion of only a number of enterprises was mentioned.

In addition to saving on expenditures, which will make itself felt in 1991 at the earliest, there are also practical circumstances that explain this step by the USSR such as demographic development and a shortage of a young Russian labor force.

The first deep drop in the birth-rate took place under Khrushchev between 1958 and 1964. It was the result of Stalin's "purges" in the second half of the 1930's and the war losses of 1941-1945. At that time there were not enough draftees for the 3-year term of military service during those years (now 2-year). The birth-rate initially increased under Brezhnev, but in the early 1970's it again began dropping in the main Russian regions for a variety of reasons. A period of a new biological drop is setting in now, not so dramatic but longer than under Khrushchev.

Meanwhile, attention is very rarely paid to the fact that fluctuations in the numerical strength of the Soviet Armed Forces correspond quite precisely to demographic changes. Khrushchev cut back 36 of the then-existing 175 divisions 30 years ago. Sixteen divisions stationed outside the USSR were withdrawn; this was done without any negotiations either with the West or China. And two of them were withdrawn from the GDR. In 1964, when Khrushchev was ousted (also due to armed forces reductions), the Soviet Army numbered 3.3 million—140 divisions (including 26 abroad) and 35,000 tanks. A layer is being removed from this level today—qualitative and, possibly, quantitative, limiting the offensive capability.

Also of concern is the Soviet inclination towards unilateral and, consequently, non-committal actions. In 1948, Stalin withdrew troops from Czechoslovakia—Brezhnev put them in there in 1968. Khrushchev left Mongolia in 1956—Brezhnev again entered there in 1966. Khrushchev reduced the Soviet Armed Forces in the GDR by two divisions—Brezhnev drove people and equipment there, as they say, "for a start." American experts are convinced that M.S. Gorbachev is a man of a different mold. But no one in the West can be sure that someone like Brezhnev will not come after him.

The announced withdrawal of six tank divisions from the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary is an important step, for it has significant importance for structures (especially as it concerns the capability for the offensive and surprise attack). M.S. Gorbachev announced 5,000 tanks and 50,000 service men in this regard. But even if four divisions and, as announced, ground assault units leave the GDR, the remaining divisions (there will then be 15 left in the GDR, 7 of which are tank divisions) will be "reorganized." But after this the East will still have a great superiority over the West. American experts are convinced that Moscow must take into account the possibility of opposition from its military, which up to now has not come out against disarmament as such, but only against (and sharply) unilateral cuts. The Soviet General Staff is primarily afraid of the West's airborne potential, which presently, as a result of disasters and their resulting reaction of politicians, like flight restrictions is weakening in the FRG "from within."

Allies ask in this regard: Won't the benefit which implementation of the Soviet "forced operation," it appears, promises the West be nullified by the weakening of readiness and defense in certain Western European countries? Harmful disarmament steps which fix Soviet superiority at a "lower level" can lead to a weakening. Individual governments and parties are responding to this, but the consequences affect the North Atlantic alliance as a whole.

#### **Rebuttal by PRAVDA Correspondent**

52000002 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Jan 89 p 6

[Article by Ye. Grigoryev, special PRAVDA correspondent in Bonn: "Are the Soviets Aggressive?"]

[Text] Herbert Kremp is a well-known West German journalist, not long ago editor-in-chief of the newspaper DIE WELT, and now an analyst for the paper. Readers of DIE WELT are very familiar with his conservative views. For several decades now he has been trying to convince us that the "Soviets" are aggressive, no matter what they do they cannot be trusted, they respect only force—military and that of forced circumstances, and therefore NATO's policy of armament and deterrence must be preserved.

It seems to me, however, this is not the predominant public opinion in the FRG today. The provisions of the Soviet leader's New York speech and the new USSR proposals and steps announced are finding widespread approval here. Even among conservative circles they are giving rise to sentiments in favor of new approaches and initiatives on the West's part. Be that as it may, there are still those like Herbert Kremp who occupy a prominent place in the West German political landscape.

It is another matter that Mr Kremp and like-minded persons have lost their former confidence. His article is instructive as a sample of stagnant NATO propaganda. At the same time, it is curious as an attempt to draw up some "set of arguments."

Undoubtedly, the readers of PRAVDA will have no particular difficulty in discovering its Achilles heel. The point is that even recognizing the major importance of the Soviet steps, try as he might, Mr Kremp cannot step over his own shadow. To accept our new political thinking and new political and philosophical concepts of security and dismiss, finally, perceiving in a confrontational spirit the processes of international development would mean for him to be left without the "image of an enemy." Would NATO not be viable without this? Therefore the thesis that the Soviet Union's initiative is a "forced measure" is being taken as the basis.

Of course, economic considerations play their role, and a considerable one, in our country's actions. However, predicting that the Soviet Union and socialism are on the verge of collapse, Mr Kremp, judging from the disturbing tone of his article, does not believe this very much himself, nor do many in the FRG. Prominent representatives of West German economic circles are now speaking out against dramatizing the difficulties, as much inevitable, in their opinion, as temporary, in the course of radical economic reform in the USSR. These circles see well its prospects. The West German captains of economics have always been known for their circumspection and realism.

Kremp's demographic passage is also quite original. It has the same transparent implication as the "forced measure" thesis: He says, after the reductions, sooner or later everything will return to the averages. But let us look at the experience of the FRG itself. Its birth-rate is far behind the Soviet Union, being next to last in Europe. The demographic situation, of course, is not being ignored by the FRG Ministry of Defense, but its reaction is by no means to reduce the Bundeswehr. On the contrary, citing the unfavorable birth-rate, the ministry recently sought to increase the term of military service from 15 to 18 months. There are some demographic problems for you...

Like other defenders of NATO, Mr Kremp resorts to juggling figures taken arbitrarily. He wants to use them to drown the true scale of the forthcoming reductions of Soviet Armed Forces in Europe, which impresses the

West German public so much. You see: In all his reshuffling of figures, he does not even mention that the Soviet Armed Forces will be cut by 500,000 soldiers and officers, 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 combat aircraft.

But we will not be deceived: Certain passages in the article, to be sure, will create the doubts needed by its author in the minds of uninformed West Germans. It is good that most people in the FRG today understand the utilitarian meaning of NATO propaganda and the fallacy of talk about the "Soviet threat," and draw their own conclusions based on real facts.

But Mr Kremp has a far-reaching aim. One of the purposes of his article is to discredit any unilateral initiatives of the USSR as such. He is quite concerned—and he does not hide this—by the infectiousness of such a "bad example," even for allies, of "individual governments and parties." Analogies with the past are set in motion. But they are hardly pertinent when forecasting the future.

On the whole, the article in DIE WELT leaves a contradictory impression. To some degree, the spirit of the times has not side-stepped it and has forced the author to recognize the growing influence of the Soviet views and initiatives outlined from the rostrum at the United Nations on human minds. On the other hand, Mr Kremp still has not found a solution to the dilemma facing NATO—how to exist without an "image of an enemy," without more and more spirals in the arms race? It is hard to say when the new political thinking will make its way into the consciousness of the NATO apologists. They continue to oppose their own disarmament and today—and this is a paradox—even unilateral Soviet disarmament, which they have called upon the USSR to do from every podium.

#### **Polish Unilateral Troop Cut Announcement Praised**

52000004 Moscow *SELSKAYA ZHIZN* in Russian  
6 Jan 89 p 3

[Commentary by Vladimir Solovyev: "NATO Is in No Hurry"]

[Text] After the unilateral reduction in the Soviet Armed Forces, the number of people wearing military uniforms on our continent will be reduced by 500,000. The figure will be higher for the reason alone that the armed forces of yet another member of the Warsaw Pact has been reduced by nearly 15,000 men.

According to the PAP News Agency, in the final days of 1988 the Defense Committee of the Polish People's Republic passed a number of important resolutions on the reorganization of the republic's Armed Forces and the reorientation of the capacities of a number of military industry plants to meet the needs of the national economy and a reduction in the share of defense expenditures from 7 to 5.5 percent of the state budget. Two

mechanized divisions and several aviation and artillery units have been deactivated and some combat ordnance has been removed from operational status.

This decision is a strong confirmation of the firm intention of the socialist countries to structure their defense on the basis of the principles of sensible sufficiency. Unquestionably, this step will trigger many responses and comments. It is anticipated that there will be total unity in assessing the contributory factors to this new step taken by the Polish government. It indicates changes in the political atmosphere in Europe thanks to the peace-making activities of the USSR and the other fraternal countries and the strengthening of confidence on the continent, particularly under the influence of the Soviet-American INF Treaty, which marked the beginning of real disarmament.

Let us note the following feature: The unilateral actions taken by the USSR and the Polish People's Republic were taken against the background of consultations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact on formulating the framework [mandat] of the future talks on conventional armed forces and armaments in Europe. However, although the Western side has welcomed in words the reduction in the level of military confrontation, it is in no hurry whatsoever to add its own figures to the new "500 + 15" formula. Such a stance hardly contributes to enhancing the weight of its peace-loving declarations.

Second: By making a goodwill gesture, the socialist countries do not intend in the least to disarm themselves down to a point which would threaten their security. In the spirit of the new thinking, the only objective is to strengthen our common European home. Experience has proved that stockpiles of weapons do not strengthen security. Those who claim that peace can be preserved through force should think about this.

#### **NATO Low-Altitude Flight Training Said To Circumvent INF Treaty**

[Editorial report] 52000006p Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian for 24 January 1989 publishes on page 3 a 500-word "Military-Political Commentary" by Captain M. Zheglov headlined "Aren't There a Lot of Victims?" Zheglov discusses the public pressure in West Germany to halt low-altitude training flights in the country by NATO air forces, in view of recent air crashes resulting from such flights. He cites FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE to the effect that such training is necessary despite the dangers in order to ensure NATO's ability to carry out deep air strikes against targets in the GDR and Czechoslovakia in the event of war.

Zheglov concludes: "The cochairman of the Greens Party fraction in the FRG parliament, H. Lippelt, spoke on one more aspect of these flights. As is known, in accordance with its arms 'modernization' plans NATO is to get new air-launched nuclear missiles with a range of about 500 kilometers. Penetrating at low altitudes into the rear areas of the airspace of Warsaw Pact states, the planes carrying the missiles can destroy with these nuclear weapons targets far beyond the 500-kilometer

zone and thereby, the West German deputy thinks, fulfill the functions of the medium- and shorter-range missiles liquidated under the INF treaty.

"Thus it turns out that the NATO summer exercises inflict losses also on the Soviet-American agreement and on the very regime of trust and stability which has begun to take shape in Europe. Haven't there been enough victims already?"

**Retired Generals Author Book on Peace,  
Disarmament**

[Editorial report] 52000014 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian for 26 January 1989 carries on page 3 a 300-word item by Lieutenant Colonel V. Markushin

on the publication of a book entitled "Thoughts on Security in the Nuclear Age" [Razmyshleniya o bezopastnosti v yadernyy vek]. The authors' collective consists of retired senior officers, who are members of two groups: the West European organization Generals for Peace and Disarmament, and the Soviet organization Soviet Generals and Admirals for Peace and Disarmament. Among the authors are: Major General V. Makarevskiy, Lieutenant General M. Milshteyn, Major General R. Simonyan, Lieutenant General A. Shevchenko, Major General J. Christie of Norway, Brigadier General M. Harbottle of Great Britain, Major General M. Meienfeld of the Netherlands, and Vice Admiral A. Sanguinetti of France. The book is being brought out by Progress Publishers.

## AUSTRIA

### Foreign Ministry Aide on CW Inspection of Libyan Plant

AU0501195089 Vienna Television Service  
in German 1830 GMT 5 Jan 89

[Interview with Dr Helmut Hoenig, Foreign Ministry adviser on chemical and biological weapons, by ORF journalist Alois Kogler in Vienna on 5 January—recorded]

[Text] Libya wants to invite foreign journalists to inspect the chemical plant in Al-Rabtah. It remains to be seen whether a local inspection will bring the required clarification.

[Kogler] Today chemical or pharmaceutical factories are often huge plants that extend over whole districts of a town. Is it possible for experts to ascertain from the outside, by means of detailed aerial photographs, for example, whether pharmaceuticals or deadly chemical warfare agents are being produced inside?

[Hoenig] A chemical factory, particularly one that produces pharmaceuticals or small chemicals, is basically a large kitchen where pots are arranged, which we call reactors or boilers, and in which the most varied substances can, of course, be produced or processed. For this reason, it is very difficult to draw conclusions on the basis of external inspections, by aerial photographs in particular, whether chemical warfare agents or other chemicals are being produced at the factory.

[Kogler] Mr Hoenig, would you be in a position to find out what is being produced at the plant by simply walking through the factory?

[Hoenig] On the basis of certain factors, such as increased security measures or similar provisions, one could draw the conclusion that dangerous substances are being produced there.

[Kogler] The factory south of Tripoli will start operation during the coming weekend. Will it be possible to find out what is being produced, once production has started?

[Hoenig] If chemical warfare agents are really produced there, one could find that out on the basis of the current highly sensitive detection methods for such chemical warfare agents and basic materials.

## FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

### DER SPIEGEL Alleges Libyan CW Production Plan Known in 1986

#### Ost: 'Information Taken Seriously'

LD1401094589 Hamburg DPA in German 0808 GMT  
14 Jan 89

[Excerpt] Hamburg (DPA)—According to a report in the news magazine DER SPIEGEL, the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) first informed the Federal Government

in 1986 about German assistance in the alleged Libyan production of poisonous gas. According to DER SPIEGEL the Federal Government did not take the reports from German and U.S. intelligence services seriously, even though the BND on several occasions "urgently" and "specifically" told the Chancellor of involvement by German firms.

Government spokesman Friedhelm Ost stated on Friday that the Federal Government had received "information to be taken seriously" in mid-October "through our services" about German participation in a poison gas factory. By contrast, the daily newspaper DIE WELT reported that BND President Hans-Georg Wieck had given the Chancellery information about the construction of the factory in Libya and possible German involvement on 30 September 1988. Waldemar Schreckenberger, secretary of state in the Chancellery responsible for the intelligence services, told the HAMBURGER MORGENPOST that last October and November "covert investigations" were started so that the "firms under suspicion did not become suspicious". [passage omitted]

#### Aid to Libyan Air Force Highlighted

AU1601185489 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German  
16 Jan 89 p 67

[Unattributed article: "Sheets, Rivets, and Nuts"]

[Excerpt] The production of poison gas at Al-Rabtah apparently forms part of a comprehensive Libyan plan for the destruction of arch-enemy Israel. Besides the development of their own chemical weapons production, the Libyans are currently rearming their Air Force—with the aim of extending the operational radius of their bombers to Jerusalem, which is 1,500 km away. Here, too, FRG firms grant crucial development aid.

Less than 70 km from Al-Rabtah, in a strictly shielded air base near the capital of Tripoli, German engineers have been busy for more than 2 years changing Libyan Hercules transport planes into flying gasoline stations. At the same time, they are equipping French Mirage fighter bombers and Soviet MiG interceptor aircraft with special devices allowing the Libyans to refuel their jets in flight and fly to Israel. [passage omitted]

#### Spokesman Ost Rejects Accusations on Libya in DER SPIEGEL

AU1401204089 Mainz ZDF Television Network  
in German 1800 GMT 14 Jan 89

[Barbara Friedrichs interview with Government spokesman Friedhelm Ost; date and place not given]

[Text] [Friedrichs] Mr State Secretary, the news magazine DER SPIEGEL maintains that the Federal Intelligence Service informed the Federal Chancellery as early as 1986 very specifically about a German involvement in a possible production of poison gas in Libya. Is this correct?

[Ost] No, it is not. The first vague information was received in late September and followed by the first serious information in mid-October. Some people seem to get mixed up with the fact that the FRG Government, particularly on the instructions of the coordinator of the Intelligence Service, Prof Schreckenberger, has continually gathered general information about projects for the production of poison gas in the Middle East since the beginning of the eighties. However, the first serious information about the involvement of a German company came in mid-October.

[Friedrichs] In order to compare FRG findings with those of the United States, you dispatched a group of experts to Washington which has returned this morning. What are the results?

[Ost] The FRG experts, who had met with specialists in Washington, have made a first, provisional analysis, and, together with their U.S. colleagues, studied and analyzed material. First, what is important is that there are no fundamentally new findings. Second, there is no additional material that could be utilized in court. There are some interesting details, which do strengthen our findings, so to speak—the involvement of a number of FRG companies, but also of a number of foreign firms from our European neighboring countries. The U.S. experts have information that some 3,000 tons of chemicals are stored in this chemical complex in Libya, chemicals that can be turned into poison gas.

[Friedrichs] Is there any evidence that FRG companies have supplied chemicals?

[Ost] I cannot answer this exactly. As I have said before, the material will be thoroughly analyzed so that we can find out what it was exactly that FRG companies have supplied—materials, chemicals, equipment, machines, or similar things. All this will have to be investigated again on the basis of the material which has been analyzed in the United States.

**Spokesman Ost on Experts' Review on U.S. Evidence on Libya**

*LD1401142889 Hamburg DPA in German  
1311 GMT 14 Jan 89*

[Text] Bonn (DPA) The German commission of experts which traveled to Washington for information on possible German assistance in the alleged Libyan production of poison gas has returned to Bonn "without material which could be used as evidence in court". Government spokesman Friedhelm Ost announced on Saturday that a first examination has revealed that the documents submitted by the Americans do not go any further than what is already known. According to Ost, it emerges from the U.S. information that, as well as a number of German firms, numerous companies from other countries are also involved in providing supplies to the chemical

factory in Libya. According to the U.S. information, the supplies also include chemicals which are intended for the production of chemical warfare agents.

According to Ost, the Federal Government has immediately introduced measures to tighten up laws on trade with foreign countries in the military-strategic sphere. Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl expects that these steps will be adopted by the Bundestag early in 1989. In addition, the Federal Government backs improvements in the way investigating authorities are used in this regard.

With regard to the criticism over the delays in releasing information on the supplies to the Libyan firm, Ost said that the Federal Government did not go immediately to the public with the information from the intelligence service in order not to endanger the investigations which were then under way. This was so that companies and persons who might have been involved were not given advanced warning through the media.

After the Federal Chancellor and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher were approached by U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz in Washington on 15 November, about the Libyan chemical factory, the Chancellor immediately demanded an exchange of information by the relevant German and U.S. experts. A U.S. Delegation went to Bonn for talks on 22 December but was unable to submit any material that would stand up in court.

Ost said that the Federal Government had regular briefings on projects for poison gas production in the Near and Middle East from the intelligence service since the early 1980's. The parliamentary control commission was also been informed about it. From the outset the government took very seriously all indications about the possible involvement of German firms in the chemical factory in Libya.

**Libyan CW Plant Construction Said Known to FRG in September 1988**

*AU1401201089 Hamburg DIE WELT in German  
14 Jan 89 p 1*

["ms." report: "First Information About Libya in September. Have BND Warnings Been Ignored?"]

[Text] Bonn—Hans-Georg Wieck, president of the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), informed the FRG Chancellery as far back as 30 September 1988 about the construction of a chemical factory in Libya and about the suspected involvement of German businessmen. According to information received by DIE WELT, the BND provided further reports with new findings and assessments to the FRG Government in October 1988. These included the information that the Libyan factory might produce poison gas. Yesterday [13 January], the FRG Government said that Chancellor Helmut Kohl was briefed on this information.



Up to now it has been generally believed that Kohl learned about the suspected involvement of German companies from U.S. Secretary of State Shultz and CIA chief Webster on 15 November 1988 during his visit to the United States. The Chancellory rejected the assumption that Bonn had ignored the warnings of the BND.

According to information in DIE WELT, the BND mentioned the name Imhausen for the first time in a report on 18 October 1988, adding that the U.S. intelligence service had reported in August that Imhausen had allegedly helped build the chemical factory. This note includes the notice that the Zollkriminalinstitut (ZKI) [Tariff Criminal Investigation Institute] in Cologne has been informed and is conducting investigations.

After that, the BND has continually supplied Bonn with information, however classified it as "not usable in court" until 4 January. It was only on 5 January 1989 that the BND noted that now there were papers with incriminating factors. On 4 January 1989, the ZKI received the files (which filled 12 removal boxes) from the Frankfurt branch office of Iraqi businessman Barboutie. Barboutie is said to have controlled the orders for and the construction of the chemical factory in Libya, but has been a fugitive since late summer 1988. His firm in Frankfurt will be liquidated. The BND had hinted about these files and examined part of them before.

In a letter to the Chancellory from 12 January 1989, Wieck speaks of the planning and construction of the "Pharma 150" project, however makes no mention of the production of chemical warfare agents. According to what DIE WELT learned from the ZKI yesterday, there has been "no specific suspicion" against a company or person. However, one can regard business negotiations of the Imhausen company with Libya as certain, the ZKI noted. The special state prosecutor's offices for economic crimes in Mannheim and Frankfurt have up to now declined to initiate preliminary investigations on the basis of the material that has been available so far.

However, the state prosecutor in Offenburg has in the meantime initiated such proceedings against Imhausen. As was confirmed in Bonn, the company received research subsidies for technologies in the field of liquefying coal in the late seventies and early eighties. How much money the company received is not clear yet.

The Parliamentary Control Commission for the Secret Services will deal with the events surrounding the chemical factory in Libya on Tuesday [17 January]. It has become public that a statement by Foreign Minister Genscher in which he maintains that there has been no information on the part of German authorities, has caused surprise in the BND. According to the Foreign Ministry, this is the reason why President Wieck is said to have called Genscher and pointed to the early and intensive reports of the BND.

## STERN Alleges State-Owned Company Involved in Libya Affair

### Salzgitter Group Accused

AU1601150189 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network  
in German 1200 GMT 16 Jan 89

[Text] According to a report by the Hamburg magazine STERN, the state-owned Salzgitter Group is also involved in the affair concerning the participation of FRG firms in constructing a chemical plant in Libya. In its next edition, STERN reports that the Al-Rabitah plant was constructed according to plans from the drawing boards of the subsidiary Salzgitter Industriebau GmbH. This possibly explains the slow progress of the investigations of the German authorities, the report stresses. According to STERN, one of the company's directors has identified a part of a plan submitted to him as having been produced by his enterprise. However, the director has denied that Salzgitter Industriebau GmbH sold plans for a chemical plant to Libya. On the contrary, they worked for a German firm that planned to implement a project named "Pharma 150" in Hong Kong. The director has not disclosed the name of this firm.

According to STERN investigations, Imhausen Chemie Company in Lahr in the Black Forest, which has been primarily incriminated by the Americans, is presently constructing a chemical plant in Hong Kong, allegedly with the project name of "Pharma 150."

### Further on Allegations

LD1601163389 Hamburg DPA in German  
1421 GMT 16 Jan 89

[Excerpts] Hamburg, (DPA)—The plans by which the alleged chemical weapons factory in Libya was built originate, according to information from STERN magazine, from the subsidiary of the Federal-owned concern Salzgitter AG, "Salzgitter Industriebau gmbh" (SIG). On behalf of Imhausen-Chemie, which is accused by the Americans of being involved with the project in Libya, SIG says itself that it prepared draft plans for a chemical factory in Hong Kong for Dm7 million.

There have not been the least indications pointing toward Libya in this connection, a spokesman for SIG told DPA. The design work involved piping and electronics for a plant to manufacture pharmaceutical products.

According to the STERN report, the Far East enterprise is only a "cover". The plant bears the project name 'Pharma 150', which is also used for the plant at al-Rabitah, Libya. As the magazine says in its latest issue, this factory is a third as large as the Libyan plant. The U.S. secret service, CIA, has reported that supplies for the plant in the desert have been declared as destined for Hong Kong, but turned up in Libya. [passage omitted]

Federal Finance Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg told the press in Bonn that after the initial agency reports of the alleged involvement of Salzgitter in the construction of a chemical weapons factory, "this morning action was taken to have information gathered." The minister confirmed that the company management had given information about how SIG had received only the order for plans for a pharmaceutical factory in Hong Kong from Imhausen-Chemie. This information had to be taken seriously.

Nevertheless, extreme restraint is required in evaluating the information. What is known so far by no means leads to the conclusion that German firms were involved in punishable activities. The Salzgitter indications seemed conclusive to him, Stoltenberg said. The Federal Republic, as owner, will now embark on serious discussions with Salzgitter AG.

The minister also rejected accusations of delays by the responsible authorities in dealing with the chemical weapons factory in Libya. However, he divulged that the criminal customs institute has been informed of "possible involvement by German firms in the construction of a warfare agents plant in Libya" since the start of August last year. The indications, however have been "so vague" that they did not justify the institution of executive measures on the grounds of maintaining law and order." [passage omitted]

#### **Merck, Tewes Firms Also Implicated in Libya CW Affair**

*LD1601231289 Hamburg DPA in German  
2231 GMT 16 Jan 89*

[Text] Hamburg (DPA)—The Merck chemical firm in Darmstadt is also among the companies from the Federal Republic which participated in supplying the Libyan technology center in al-Rabatah.

Merck spokesman Hans-Joachim Schmitt confirmed on ZDF television's "Heute-Journal" this evening a large-scale delivery of 19 tonnes of the "Universal chemical" dichloroethane to the Libyans last April.

A chemical factory is being built up in the area of the technology complex in which weapons can be produced according to Bonn's latest information.

However, the Merck spokesman said dichloroethane has over a hundred possible uses, for example for extracting oils and resins or as a solvent in medicine.

The Frankfurt firm Alfred Tewes GmbH, mainly known for its car brakes, was named as another firm in the Federal Republic which supplied the "Pharma 150" project. The management confirmed during the ZDF program that it delivered ventilation and air extraction equipment worth over DM 5 million in 1986.

The delivery took place "from the factory gate in Frankfurt" from where it was "to be forwarded" to its destination in Hong Kong. At the time the firm thought the delivery had gone to China.

#### **Government Repeats: 'No Conclusive Proof' of Libyan CW Factory**

*LD1701165289 Hamburg DPA in German  
1541 GMT 17 Jan 89*

[Excerpt] Bonn (DPA)—As before the Federal Government has no conclusive proof about the setting up of a chemical-weapons factory in Libya. At the Federal news conference today Federal spokesman Friedhelm Ost did not wish to confirm yesterday's remarks by Gerhard Stoltenberg, Federal minister of finance, to the effect that it is now to be assumed "that the factory is now an installation in which poison gas can be produced".

Asked whether this is now the official government position Ost merely referred to tomorrow's Bundestag debate, when the connections and the background will be described by Wolfgang Schaeuble (CDU), head of the chancellery. [passage omitted]

#### **Press Critical of Government Stance on Libyan CW Issue**

##### **Press Review for 17 January**

*AU1701120189 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network  
in German 0605 17 Jan 89*

[Text] Concerning the possible production of chemical weapons in Libya, SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in Munich asks the following question: How long may politics paralyze criminal law, as has been the case in the FRG Government up to now? True, office-holders, who have knowledge of a crime, are not obliged to report it to the police—this holds true for FRG ministers and the FRG chancellor. However, there is also the political culture of a constitutional state, which can certainly not accept that the state power that is responsible for the prosecution of crimes can initiate investigations only on the basis of media reports, because the other state power, the executive, does not disclose what it knows and pretends that nothing has happened. What is equally scandalous is that the judicial authority has to complete its files with newspaper clippings, because the government reserves itself the right to determine what can be used as evidence in court and what cannot, the commentator in SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG concludes.

AUGSBURGER ALLGEMEINE notes: The damage has become even more severe after Finance Minister Stoltenberg admitted yesterday [16 January] that Bonn had been informed of the suspicion by the Federal Intelligence Service as far back as early August 1988, a suspicion, which was reiterated by President Reagan in a talk with Chancellor Kohl in November. How naive is the Economic Ministry to include Hungary, but not Libya, in the list of those states that must by no means be

granted support by military experts? It is indeed nothing very new—except to the Economic Ministry, of course—that Al-Qadhdhafi is one of the wirepullers in international terrorism. Party friends of Foreign Minister Genscher, who support a strict ban on chemical weapons in Paris, have headed the Economic Ministry for years, but, after all, business is business, AUGSBURGER ALLGEMEINE comments.

FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE writes: The fact that within a few days a new administration will be established in Washington offers a chance for the FRG Government to make efforts for a new start in FRG-U.S. relations. The controversy over German involvement in the construction of a chemical weapons factory in Libya has shown that this is what we badly need. Bonn had ignored U.S. information about suspected involvement over many months, or even one and ½ years, according to other sources. It was Secretary of State George Shultz himself, who finally passed the information on to Chancellor Kohl. This can only mean that normal contacts to Bonn do not work properly. That there was a controversy over presenting evidence is proof of lack of confidence. This is of course officially denied, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE concludes.

#### Press Review for 19 January

AU1901155589 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network  
in German 0605 GMT 19 Jan 89

[From the press review]

[Text] SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG has the following comment on the parliamentary debate on the involvement of FRG companies in the construction of a chemical complex in Al-Rabitah: The Libyan affair, which has now been thoroughly discussed by the FRG Government as a result of public pressure, makes clear that too little was done too late in order to stop the participation of FRG exporters in poison gas projects abroad. Apart from the question of legality, the reproach that it was, above all, the lack of political control, gets to the bottom of the matter. If one takes the regulations of the Foreign Trade Law as a yardstick, one can with some effort resign themselves to the viewpoint that everything that was required by law had been done at any given time. The real scandal of this affair from the German point of view has largely to do with something else: With the way in which this case and other previous cases were dealt with politically, SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG writes.

FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE notes: Minister in the Chancellery Schaeuble took the bull by the horns in the Bundestag on Wednesday [18 January]—yet this will not spare him from further attacks. Even if the Federal Intelligence Service did inform the chancellor as early as August 1987 that a complex was being built in Libya that might serve for the production of chemical weapons, it could mean nothing to the FRG Government at the time, because the Federal Intelligence Service expressly added that there were no signs of an involvement by

FRG firms. Whether there was such—prohibited— involvement can hardly be ascertained. For everything that is required to produce chemical weapons can also be used for peaceful purposes. Yet, even the government of a state which imposes very little control on its economy has a certain responsibility, to which it can hardly come up to, as one has to admit. Besides, the FRG is an exporting country; countries, which according to their interior order to not quite comply with European standards, should not be excluded from exports on the basis of a friendly attitude toward developing countries, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE stresses.

NEUE OSNABRUECKE ZEITUNG states: The speech delivered by Wolfgang Schaeuble in the Bundestag should be regarded as an opportunity for domestic policy to deal with the Libyan affair in a more business-like way. The minister in the Chancellery put an end to the confusion created by the government declarations to date, and finally gave a detailed account of when certain FRG authorities and officials received information about what has been going on in Al-Qadhdhafi's witch's kitchen. There is no evidence of mistakes, attempts to delay or even cover up certain actions on the side of the state authorities. Therefore, no one should be doubtful about the FRG Government's determination to prevent FRG companies from helping construct a chemical plant in Libya. However, current laws have left little leeway for the government up to now. The reforms that have been announced will not yet have any effect as far as Libya is concerned, but at least they prove that the government wants to proceed more efficiently in the future, NEUE OSNABRUECKER ZEITUNG comments.

MANNHEIMER MORGEN holds the following view: It becomes increasingly evident that the FRG Government with its policy of withholding information has lost its credibility and reputation in the question of the Libyan chemical weapons plant. However, it is not merely the government's reputation but that of the entire FRG. How could the chancellor and his advisers have believed that they would get away with their covert action, with playing for time, and with its hypocritical pose of innocence—an attitude, which made even our friendly neighbors suspect that it was an unfortunate attempt of hushing-up. Nobody can claim now that Bonn has done nothing to study the information, however, whether it has acted in good time and vigorously enough, considering the political dimension of the affair, seems to be more than questionable, MANNHEIMER MORGEN notes.

#### Bundestag Debate on Chemical Plant in Libya

LD1801143088 Hamburg DPA in German  
1230 GMT 18 Jan 89

[Excerpts] Bonn (DPA)—In August 1987 the Federal Intelligence Service received information that a new industrial plant, which with great probability contained a chemical weapon plant, was being constructed near Al-Rabtah in Libya. This was announced by Federal

Chancellery Chief Wolfgang Schaeuble (CDU) today in the Bundestag in the debate on the possible participation of German firms in the construction of this industrial complex in Libya.

At the request of the opposition Schaeuble gave an exact account of events as learned from German sources and of the knowledge of the controversial Libyan plant. In May 1988 the Foreign Ministry received from the U.S. Embassy in Bonn a working paper which noted that possibly three German firms were involved in the construction of the chemical complex and in the conversion of Libyan military aircraft to be able to refuel in flight. In the U.S. paper, according to the minister, there were claims that "chemical weapons could possibly be produced" in the plant.

The ministries responsible, the Customs Criminal Institute, and the Federal Office of Economics were informed immediately of the U.S. information, according to Schaeuble. [passage omitted]

Schaeuble then said: "On the basis of intelligence we have to assume that the plant in Al-Rabtah is capable of producing chemical weapons. Whether an offense has been committed is the subject of investigation. The Federal Government can make no forecasts about the outcome of this procedure." [passage omitted]

SPD Deputy Norbert Gansel strongly criticized in particular the attitude of Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and accused the Federal Government of still not having comprehended the "political dimension" of the Libyan affair. He justified this with Schaeuble's preceding remarks. The Federal Government has only admitted what has become known about the involvement of German firms through U.S. indiscretions or the "respectful" research of German journalists.

Gansel said that Kohl was politically responsible that the German and international public were "deceived" and that German-U.S. relations were seriously damaged. The SPD deputy, armaments export control expert in his parliamentary group, spoke of a long chain of German armaments export scandals. The German armaments export industry has done business that is forbidden for U.S. firms.

In this connection he recalled the illegal delivery of nuclear technology to Pakistan and especially the continuing suspicion that German firms contributed to the production of poison gas in Iraq. Some 38 people are being investigated, he said, referring to an interim report presented by the Federal Government recently under pressure from parliament.

#### **Spokesman on Germ Warfare Research in Iraq, Libya**

*LD1901210889 Hamburg DPA in German  
1819 GMT 19 Jan 89*

[Excerpt] Bonn/Washington (DPA)—According to Government spokesman Friedhelm Ost, the FRG Government has information that research activities are being

carried out in Iraq in the sphere of bacteriological weapons. There are also isolated indications that production may have started, Ost announced in Bonn this evening. However, a final judgment is not possible at present; there is, however, no evidence to suggest that FRG scientists or technicians are involved. He reported this to the private television station RTL-Plus when talking about the secret services.

Ost said that there are some indications that Libya intends to conduct bacteriological weapons research in a planned institute for microbiology. This cannot be confirmed either, and nothing was known about FRG participation. Ost referred to the sentencing in Munich in April 1988 of a German who delivered small quantity of mycotoxins to Iraq.

RTL-Plus reported on Wednesday [18 January] evening that scientists and technicians from the FRG are said to have helped build a bacteriological weapons factory south of the Iraqi capital, Baghdad. On Thursday, the station reported that a total of 24 FRG firms are suspected, according to information from the CIA, of having been involved in the building of production sites for biological and chemical weapons. The secret CIA list also named 12 firms from other countries.

Quoting Wednesday's RTL-Plus report the SPD Bundestag Deputy Wilfried Penner on Thursday called for another meeting of the parliamentary control commission for the secret services, of which he is a member.

According to RTL-Plus on Thursday, the U.S. Defense Department assumes that 10 states around the world are now either developing or producing biological weapons, including Syria, DPRK, Iran and Iraq. [passage omitted]

#### **FRG Firms Said Involved in Iraqi Bacteriological Weapons Projects**

*LD2501145589 Hamburg DPA in German  
1407 GMT 25 Jan 89*

[Excerpts] Bonn (DPA)—The Federal Government has no real proof usable in court, of involvement by German firms and senior employees in the development of bacteriological weapons in Iraq. It was said that information from the government side during a session of the Parliamentary Control Commission for the Secret Services (PKK), today, proposed by the SPD was appropriately discreet and guarded.

Wilfried Penner, deputy chairman of the SPD parliamentary group, cited information according to which there have already been reports on German participation. [passage omitted]

Last week the private television channel RTL-Plus reported that scientists and technicians from the Federal Republic had helped in the construction of a biological weapons factory south of the Iraqi capital, Baghdad. According to the U.S. intelligence service, the CIA, a

total of 24 Federal German firms are suspected of having been involved in the construction of production centers for biological and chemical weapons. Government spokesman Freidhelm Ost stated with regard to this that the Federal Government has information that there is biological weapons research activity in Iraq. But no findings have been disclosed on the involvement of German workers.

### **Export of Weapons, Military-Related Technology Examined**

*AU2401211289 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German  
23 Jan 89 pp 16-27*

[Unattributed report: "Doing Business With the Misery of Others?"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] The Federal Republic is an export nation. It exports television sets, printing machinery, and computers—fabulous. But German exporters also offer other good quality products: tanks and guns, missiles and submarines, militarily usable nuclear technology and chemical factories. If not before, certainly since Krupp's "Big Bertha", German military products have a frighteningly good reputation throughout the world.

Thus the Federal Republic is not just a world champion in exports as such. It also is one of the leading traders of death, arms producers, and military profiteers. German military gear is in demand, and its industry can supply—it always has death on sale.

Among the sellers of the murderous hardware, the Federal Republic holds a remarkable fifth place. Of course, the superpowers take the lead, and of course, war-tested nations like France and Britain are also present wherever people are killed. The quantity of weapons exported is astounding for a country whose fathers of the Constitution did not want arms to be produced in Germany again.

According to statistics of the Swedish peace research institute SIPRI, German military hardware worth \$1.4 billion was exported in 1987. However, this sum only covers a minor part of the war materiel that was really exported.

The Federal Economics Office granted export permits worth more than DM28.4 billion in the same year. According to these permits, German firms were permitted to sell military goods in a broader sense (arms, ammunition, trucks) worth DM6.3 billion abroad, and "other strategic goods" (computers, machine-tools) worth DM19.4 billion, as well as goods of the nuclear energy industry worth DM2.7 billion. Thus the export of military gear to 157 countries in the world accounts for 5.4 percent of German total exports.

Not everything has been supplied overtly. Tanks and helicopters are shipped to crisis areas by roundabout ways, blueprints for military gear and military-technical facilities are covered up, experts and trainers convey their knowledge discreetly. A lot of hypocrisy is involved, a lot of pretended naivete, a lot of secret approval of allegedly harmless deals.

Turning-lathes for Iran? Why not. Nobody asks what for. A pharmaceutical plant for Hong Kong? Of course. Nobody wants to know where the blueprints go.

Just as some people in Bonn get used to the facts of the Imhausen case only hesitantly, part of industry also receives the truth only reluctantly. When arms and weapons exports are at stake, the facts are obscured and covered up, and many people just pretend they do not know.

Some recent examples clearly demonstrate the way this is done. The most obvious and most gross case: the reconstruction of Libyan fighter aircraft with the help of German firms.

Less than 70 km from the site of the controversial chemical plant at Al-Rabitah, German engineers have for 3 years been busy converting Libyan Air Force "Hercules" transport planes as well as a Boeing 707 into flying gasoline stations. They also reconstruct Libyan "Mirages" and MiG 23's for the same purpose; the fighter aircraft will then be able to fly to Israel and back.

The engineers have come via the Intec firm with its place of business in Grasbrunn, near Munich, which has a technical office in Vaterstetten. Intec chief Eberhard Moehring personally hired the specialists and arranged for them to go to Libya. Intec reconstructed the jets, procured aircraft parts and equipment, and placed orders.

In contrast, Ingo Moehring, the son of owner Eberhard, claims that the company has "nothing to do" with the construction of aircraft in Libya. He says that Intec is doing business "with screws."

That is a slight understatement. On 12 February last year, not only the name of Intec Technical Trade and Logistics GmbH was changed into Intec-CTTL [Consulting Technical Trade and Logistics GmbH]. The purpose of business was also reformulated: Since then, it has included "the development of aircraft systems, aircraft components, as well as maintenance, repair, and modification of aircraft."

Staff for Libya was hired by an Intec company in Liechtenstein. As they were told in writing, they flew via Zurich where they had an opportunity "to open a giro account with Schweizerische Kreditanstalt." For continuing their flight to Islamic Libya, "taking alcohol was strictly prohibited." The company chief is not the only

one trying to play down his performance for sabre-rattling dictator Al-Qadhdhafi. Early last week, Bonn's government spokesman Friedhelm Ost defended Intec. He said that the equipment supplied can only be used for "refuelling on the ground." A video film obtained by DER SPIEGEL proves clearly how Libyan Mirages and MiG 23's try to refuel in flight.

The Imhausen case has already shown how secretly and how hypocritically German entrepreneurs act when they are doing business with dubious partners such as Al-Qadhdhafi. Even the Federal Government has realized now that with German help Al-Qadhdhafi obviously intends to construct a poison gas plant—Pharma 150—in Al-Rabitah. But everyone pretends they did not know about it—including even Juergen Hippenstiel-Imhausen, the chief of the firm organizing it all.

However, they must have known how hot the deal was. That is proved by the careful way in which the false track was laid. In Lahr, Hippenstiel had informed just a handful of his closest aides about the dual business. In Hong Kong, a plant is being built which is also called Pharma 150 and apparently serves to conceal the Libyan project.

Other companies that are involved in the Al-Rabitah project with supplies were by no means as harmless as they would like to appear. Suddenly well-known firms such as Siemens, Preussag, or Salzgitter see themselves publicly exposed. They only supplied insignificant parts for a harmless plant, did they not? Poison gas? Never heard about it.

Preussag AG (turnover DM10.4 billion, 29,000 employed) says that it supplied a drinking water processing plant for the Libyan town of Garian, 5 km from the chemical plant in Al-Rabitah.

However, the Preussag offer of 31 January 1987 is by no means intended for the town of Garian. It is clearly intended for the Tripoli Technology Center. The alleged Technology Center, located between Tripoli and Garian, including the adjacent war gas plant, is a pure arms complex. Could the suppliers know? Did they want to know that at all?

The government-owned Salzgitter AG also claims that it was totally unsuspecting. A witness has said that on the Al-Rabitah construction site, people worked according to plans of Salzgitter Industriebau GmbH (SIG), a subsidiary of Salzgitter AG (37,000 employed, turnover DM9.9 billion). The witness is Horst Koerbler, former manager of the IBI company which carried out the project for Imhausen.

In fact, SIG received an order by Imhausen worth DM8 billion. The Salzgitter concern says that these are partial plans for a pharmaceutical plant in Hong Kong. Libya had never been mentioned, the concern says.

Since Koerbler's testimony became known, the Salzgitter people have been nervous. SIG manager Andreas Boehm had talks with concern chief Ernst Pieper every day. The auditors of the concern appeared repeatedly at "Waldhaus," the company seat of SIG in Salzgitter-Druette, to search the Pharma files.

The company management declared solemnly that everything was closely examined, but the word Libya had never come to light. The auditors protectively removed all documents, about 200 files, and the staff was enjoined to be silent.

New rumors emerged about the order which kept about 45 SIG staff members busy for 2 years. Long before Koerbler made his testimony, the staff talked about the "plant for the Libyans." The staff also knew that the site is 3 and 1/2 flight hours away from Zurich.

A SIG engineer recalls that in the beginning, the company management was trying hard to keep the customer and the site secret. All relevant indications on the photocopies of the plans were covered.

Later, the SIG staff member says, the address of Pen Tsao in Hong Kong was given. The man claims that on the basis of joint meetings with Imhausen, sometimes in Lahr, sometimes in Druette, it gradually dawned on him that the real site is in Libya.

Just rumors? The concern management never even heard about these rumors.

Siemens (359,000 employed, turnover DM51 billion) has furnished additional proof of the alleged credulity of German managers. When the United States intensified pressure, Al-Qadhdhafi invited a busload of journalists to visit Al-Rabitah. A lonesome container with a clearly visible label, Siemens, got into the focus of television cameras.

The "telephone booth in the desert" (FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE) made the headlines. Siemens assumed publicly that this must be a mobile telephone container. Later, the company said that the vehicle was a material container going from one construction site to the next, as is customary in such countries. Anyway, Siemens said, the concern has nothing to do with the Libyan chemical plant.

As we know today, this statement is in fact wrong. Siemens supplied "measuring and controlling instruments for the automation of a chemical plant" worth roughly DM2.5 million to the Imhausen subsidiary company, Gesellschaft fuer Automation (GfA), in Bochum. The official destination: Hong Kong.

The Belgian firm Cross Link, a company of carrier Jozef Gedopt, who has meanwhile been arrested, notified IBI of a shipment of freighter "Roubini" on 16 December 1986. What was also on board were 9,561 kg of Siemens

products, the "Teleperm M System" ordered for Hong Kong. According to an additional cable of 18 December, the destination of the freighter was Tripoli.

Siemens continued supplying more material; its correspondence with GfA dates until the end of last year. The company asserts that all supplies were intended for Hong Kong.

But the data given in the documents were increasingly imprecise. Originally the customer was Pen Tsao in Hong Kong, then it was Gedopt J.G. Trading in Antwerp, then it was Imhausen's GfA. The original address finally developed into an ambiguous "Marking: Pen Tsao." The responsible Siemens people had more than enough opportunities to request clarification of such mysteries. They met with leading staff members of Imhausen Chemie and GfA time and again for talks and demonstrations.

How unsuspecting can a manager be, before he becomes an accomplice in criminal productions? Hippie Hippenstiel is not the first one to pretend that he did not hear or see anything, when dubious facilities are at issue.

For example, the German construction firm WTB Walter Thosti Boswau built an industrial complex of three large factories in Iraq, near Baghdad. The Cologne Infraplan company hired suppliers for "Project 9230."

The customer for the industrial complex in Falludscha [spelling of name as published] was the Iraqi State Establishment for Pesticide Production (SEPP), a department in the Industry Ministry, which also built the Samarra industrial complex north of Baghdad. According to the findings of U.S. intelligence services, four different types of poison gas were produced in Samarra last year.

One of the subcontractors who wanted to know what the Iraqi factories were supposed to produce, was told that the supplies were intended for a detergent factory.

It would have been the best guarded detergent factory in the world. A barbed-wire fence about 2.50 m high surrounds the entire complex which is about 1 km long and 600 m wide. The vacant ground on the other side of the fence and every point of the factory site can be seen from watchtowers. At night, the guards can check the ground with remote-controlled headlights.

What is really produced in Falludscha, was indicated by a WTB man who was asked about the purpose of the giant underground tanks on the site: "Detergents for two-legged flies are stored there," the construction man said.

German firms are pushing their way to the front not only regarding the construction of facilities, but also regarding everything that forms part of chemical warfare.

During the Gulf war, the Kaufbeuren entrepreneur Anton Eyerle, a former NPD [National Party of Germany] politician, supplied equipment for mobile toxicological laboratories to Iraq.

The vehicles came from Magirus Deutz. A chemical engineer of Karl Kolb GmbH, which according to U.S. reports helped set up a poison gas plant in Samarra, Iraq, helped install the laboratories. Bundeswehr experts visited the fully equipped laboratories.

Were they "laboratories for agricultural chemistry," as the suppliers claimed? Or vehicles for military use? The Darmstadt public prosecution did not even bother to start investigations. As a public prosecutor said, only firms exporting facilities for the production of chemical or biological weapons are of interest.

Nor were there any objections in March last year when the Eschborn Chemical Marketing and Machinery Agency ordered 19 tonnes of Dichlorethane from the Merck chemical concern. The material is used for the production of synthetics, but it can also be used for the production of mustard gas or yellow cross.

Following the reports on Imhausen, the firm Merck and the public prosecution suddenly showed an interest in the Eschborn firm. But the owner, a Libyan, has disappeared.

It is always the same game. Deliveries are quick, but controls are hesitant and liberal. Anything can be sold, if it is properly packed.

It is too easy to overcome the barriers to war gear and military equipment. Export permits are granted under the Foreign Trade and Payments Law. In an "export list" those goods are detailed which can only be exported with the approval of the Federal Economics Institute in Eschborn: Weapons, nuclear technical and chemical facilities, as well as computer technology. The Federal Government puts this list of goods together on the basis of the Cocom list by which 16 Western countries intend to prevent the export of military goods and technology into the East Bloc.

The personnel situation of the Federal Economics Institute alone prevents the employees of this institute from carrying out detailed checks. Every year, some 75,000 applications for export permits are received. Seventy people are available to deal with them.

The Foreign Trade and Payments Law gives clear instructions about the way the work has to be done. The authors of the commentary on the law write that "in case of doubt," the provisions must be interpreted "for the freedom principle"—for industry.

The Eschborn people can hardly prevent exports of so-called dual-use goods, meaning goods that can be used for military as well as civilian purposes. Formerly, it was said that they only have to be approved if "they are specially designed for military purposes."

That was, for instance, not the case when Gildemeister AG in Bielefeld supplied several hundred automatic machine-tools to the Soviet Union years ago. The then economics minister, Otto Graf Lambsdorff, said that "with such a lathe you can produce fountain pens as well as cartridge cases." However, because the machines were not "specially designed" for arms production, the export did not require a permit.

Now the provision is more tightly formulated: If a product is "suitable" for military use, an export permit is required.

Nothing can be supplied to crisis areas. However, it is easy to bypass this regulation: The goods are first supplied to a NATO partner.

Where they go from there, can hardly be checked. In December 1984, the firm Dynamit Nobel AG in Troisdorf shipped millions of igniting charges to Belgium which went to Iranian weapons factories via firms in Sweden and Greece.

Some firms take the direct way. They do not bother to apply for a permit in Eschborn, but ship their goods directly to the receiver. The Gelnhausen Neue Technologien GmbH and Co KG supplied parts for the production of fuel elements, furnaces for melting uranium, and a tritium plant to Pakistan which thus obtained nuclear weapons technology.

The Swiss weekly WELTWOCHTE was wondering: "God knows how Iraq got those 20-mm air-cannons of Oerlikon-Buehrle, which are mounted in Baghdad in BO-105 helicopters." The cannons which were used in the Gulf war were made in Switzerland. The helicopters were produced by Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm (MBB). God knows how they got to Iraq: from a MBB subsidiary in Spain.

German war gear everywhere, always according to the motto: If we do not supply, others will. In the Gulf war, German helicopters were in the air, Mercedes trucks on the battlefield, grenades exploded which the firm Fritz Werner Ausruestungen GmbH had helped produce. In Nicaragua the rightist Contras use automatic rifles of the firm Heckler and Koch. In the Falklands war, "Exocet" rockets with German technology hit British ships. [passage omitted]

### **Kohl Interview: NATO, FRG Conventional Arms Stance, Libyan CW Affair**

*AU2201185789 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 1005 GMT 22 Jan 89*

[Interview with Chancellor Helmut Kohl by Henning Frank; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpt] [Frank] Mr Chancellor, after the successful conclusion of the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting, the way has been cleared for negotiations on conventional disarmament, which have long been demanded by the West. Is it not a disadvantage for the FRG and the other NATO members that they enter the talks without an overall concept for security, arms control, and disarmament? Is there not the danger that during this conference NATO will be forced to go on the defensive by new proposals of the Warsaw Pact that appeal to the public, like the ones that Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev presented last week?

[Kohl] I do not think so. Negotiations will be very difficult, and, even if I am not a prophet, I can predict that they will be lengthy. Agreement has been reached within NATO that we will presumably meet in the second half of April or the beginning of May—I cannot specify the date now—in London on the occasion of the NATO anniversary. Preparations for the meeting of the heads of state and government from NATO countries are already being carried out, and the issue of the overall concept is already under discussion. Basically, the starting position is clear. The principles of the so-called Hamel report remain unchanged. Real disarmament and detente can only be achieved if the NATO members observe these principles. This means on the one hand that NATO must be in a position to defend itself, and on the other that, if we are strong and capable of defense, we want to be ready to be accommodating, to take disarmament steps. However, there must be equal concessions on both sides. So far, the Soviet Union has not submitted any proposal that would raise things to a completely new level. There are encouraging signs that, for reasons I do not want to elaborate on and which are to be found in the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev will fortunately enhance the process in this field. However, disarmament is indivisible, that means the negotiations about START, on long-range intercontinental missiles, must continue. I hope that they will soon be concluded successfully. This hope has also been expressed by the new U.S. President. We must make progress in the field of chemical weapons. The discussions in our country about recent events in Libya concerning the construction of such a plant, in particular, force us to finally achieve an international ban on these weapons. This demand has repeatedly been put forth by the FRG, our government, and, above all, by myself. The conventional sphere must, of course, also be included. Those who call for advance concessions on the part of the FRG in connection with the Bundeswehr should bear in mind that today we are in a psychological situation that is similar to the one in



1983. If we had not adopted the NATO counterarmament decision in 1983, which my predecessor Helmut Schmidt had helped bring about for good reasons, and which I always supported, the first disarmament treaty in history, the INF Treaty, would have never been possible. As a matter of fact, this treaty was concluded. On this basis, I am optimistic about future developments. However, much patience will be required.

[Frank] Are you in favor of simultaneous talks, if possible, on all these issues and of a simultaneous conclusion?

[Kohl] As far as the conclusion is concerned, I do not know whether this can be brought about. I see certain problems there. However, simultaneous negotiations are absolutely necessary. I am sure that real progress in the field that we have just discussed can only be achieved if the overall climate continues to improve.

[Frank] The political climate?

[Kohl] The political macroclimate. The path we have embarked on is correct. Weapons as an abstract concept are neither negative nor positive, neither good nor bad. It is the attitude of those who might use the weapons that has always been a cause of concern in the history of the world. The degree to which we can develop confidence—this is the key word—in each other and the degree to which a confidence-building process is initiated, which also needs its own time, will determine the extent of the progress that can be achieved. Without confidence there is no progress in this issue.

[Frank] Before this has been realized, you do not consider it conceivable to reduce the strength of the Bundeswehr?

[Kohl] There is no question about that, to put it very clearly. We have recently been discussing the question whether to annul the decision on the extension of military service to 18 months, at least for the period of a few years. You know that I was and still am against such a postponement. I am quite aware of the fact that this involves a sacrifice on the part of the young people. A sacrifice is involved if military service lasts 15 months, and a greater sacrifice is involved in the case of 18 months. However, freedom cannot be achieved free of charge. Peace and freedom in our country depend on the presence of a strong Bundeswehr. Only if we make our contribution within NATO in the form of a strong Bundeswehr, will our friends and partners, the Americans, the British, and the French—only to mention a few examples—be ready to assume their responsibility toward our country. For this reason, I insist on this. However, I have also made it clear that, if we achieve progress in the sphere of conventional disarmament in the near, in the foreseeable future, which I strongly hope, I will be the first to suggest a reconsideration of our

current position. World history, however, and particularly the history of the 21st century have taught everybody who can think and see that advance concessions have never entailed more peace but increased dangers. This is why I support the decision that has been made with my participation.

[Frank] Mr Chancellor, enormous efforts on the part of the government will be required to convince the citizens that the potential threat from the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states has decreased over the past few years.

[Kohl] This is certainly true. A discerning judgment is necessary about whether it was correct, in giving reasons for the necessity of the Bundeswehr, to attribute so much importance to arguments concerning the potential threat from the Soviet Union during the past decades and not to focus attention on the task of the Bundeswehr to defend a sovereign state which is in such an extreme geopolitical situation. Let me put it differently: The FRG's standing and reputation depends, among other things, certainly on the following two factors: its economic power and its capability to defend peace and freedom with its own Army, which includes the soldiers who are doing military service. The whole world—East and West—sees it this way. The assessment of our Bundeswehr by NATO and Warsaw Pact studies has revealed that the Bundeswehr is one of the world's most important defense armies. What we need, above all, is sympathy for our soldiers, for those who do extended service, for the professional soldiers, for the noncommissioned officers, for the officers, and primarily for those who are doing military service. The Bundeswehr is the Army of our sons, and if I put it that way, I want to convey sympathy and affection, respect and gratefulness for the service they are doing for the community and the well-being of the public. One must be fully aware of the fact that the current mood, the spirit of the time, which includes a great portion of opportunism, is conducive to views that we do not need all that. This is a dangerous attitude.

[Frank] Has the government failed to take measures in this connection?

[Kohl] I do not think that this is a question that concerns only the government. Since I assumed office, since 1 October 1982, I have repeatedly expressed my support for the Bundeswehr. During the recent budget discussions I have made it very clear that the soldiers, our soldiers, need the necessary financial and material means. However, conscious efforts were already made in the past, on the basis of certain ideological attitudes, to push the Bundeswehr into a specific corner. However, let me make it very clear that it is important that the Bundeswehr also makes its contribution. I discussed this recently with Defense Minister Scholz, who shares my view completely on this issue. The Bundeswehr itself must make its contribution through its very existence, the way the soldiers are treated. There are many young

men who willingly join the Bundeswehr to do their military service but who describe themselves as considerably less motivated when they leave the Bundeswehr. There have been complaints about (word indistinct) and many other things. We must now insist on the 18 months, and the question concerning the meaningful use of this period for young people, also in view of their later employment, must be given more attention. Another thing, which is also very important, is that we now have the chance of realizing more individual defense justice because we are not in such an urgent situation regarding the number of soldiers. I think if Scholz has a concept according to which those who will be drafted know when they will be drafted, this certainly represents sizable progress. If particularly difficult situations occur, which may arise from certain conditions within families, more flexibility should be applied. I consider this a good thing.

[Frank] This is, of course, also conditional on changes within the bureaucracy of the Bundeswehr.

[Kohl] This is certainly one of the decisive points. Those who are responsible must display great sympathy and great flexibility in their work.

[Frank] Mr Chancellor, I would like to revert once more to the changed mood in the FRG concerning the feeling of a threat. Do you agree that one of the reasons might be that it is not a Western politician but Soviet party and state leader Mikhail Gorbachev who enjoys the greatest confidence all over Europe and is seen as a great man of peace by many?

[Kohl] This is one of the reasons, but the development has also been influenced by many other factors—factors that seem quite plausible.

[Frank] Mr Chancellor, now that many changes have been brought about in the Soviet Union, and because of the positive role that Mikhail Gorbachev plays in international politics, many citizens are questioning the necessity of many burdens, such as the training flights at low altitudes of the Air Force of the Bundeswehr and of the air forces of the allies. Do you agree that the reason for this is that the government or the defense minister has not informed the public sufficiently and that some politicians within the coalition have rejected low-altitude flights?

[Kohl] My position is clear. To maintain the defense capability, the NATO planes—this refers both to the FRG Air Force and all our ground forces' planes [Erdenflieger]—must be given the chance to carry out exercises in all possible areas of deployment. This also includes low-altitude flights. However, I am also convinced—like Minister Scholz, who is really making great efforts to solve this issue—that we have a number of possibilities to reduce the number of low-altitude flights. I hope we will be able to reduce them considerably. These days we will for the first time get the chance to discuss this with the new U.S. Administration. There is no point in

making decisions for our Air Force if the same decision is not made by our U.S. partners and friends, our British partners and friends, and all those who occasionally carry out flights in the FRG. We are fully determined to do everything in our power during the next few weeks so that real improvement can be achieved.

[Frank] Does that mean that you will not leave your defense minister in the lurch on this issue?

[Kohl] I have never left any minister from my government in the lurch, and I have no intention of doing this in the present case.

[Frank] The respite that had been expected after the adoption of the great reform projects last year did not materialize because of the still unclear involvement of German companies in the planning and construction of the Libyan chemical plant in Al-Rabitah, where chemical weapons can allegedly also be produced. What must be done in addition to an unqualified clean up to prevent the participation of German companies, scientists, and engineers in such criminal dealings in the future?

[Kohl] First, I would like to specify the basic position of the government, which, of course, is also my position. I am convinced that all people with good intentions agree with me that it is unacceptable to us that German companies or individual Germans are cooperating in the production of such weapons, no matter whether this happens in the FRG or abroad. There is no question about that. There are laws in the FRG that ban such things. At the international level, a ban on chemical weapons and biological weapons has not been achieved so far. This must be made very clear. As a matter of fact, we are making efforts to bring about an international ban. It has long been overdue. According to the experiences that we have had in connection with the present case, which you just mentioned, we must certainly improve and tighten the legal instruments. As far as the specific case is concerned, I am in favor of an unqualified investigation, no matter which persons or which companies are involved. There is nothing to cover up. I have given strict orders that measures be taken in this spirit. However—and I want to state this in view of a discussion which has some very surprising elements—we are a state based on the rule of law. It is the local courts, the public prosecutor, and the auxiliary organs, such as the tariff criminal investigations institutes, which act as auxiliary organs, that are responsible. There must not be any prejudgement. The principle of the rule of law implies the strict observance of the principles. Of course, this also applies to the government. Apart from this individual case, my intention is to ensure that the required documents are presented to the legislative bodies, to the Bundestag and Bundesrat by Easter which are aimed at increasing the sentences and fines and at improving control possibilities, which is very difficult in such a great exporting country with open borders. Only recently have our friends in the United States, including

President Bush, President Reagan, and Secretary of State Shultz, made it clear that they know that we will act in this spirit. [passage omitted]

### **FRG Leaders Welcome Soviet Tactical Nuclear Arms Withdrawal**

#### **Kohl: 'Positive Contribution'**

*LD1901173189 Hamburg DPA in German  
1425 GMT 19 Jan 89*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl today welcomed the Soviet announcement on the unilateral reduction of tactical nuclear weapons as a positive contribution to arms control and disarmament. CDU-CSU Bundestag group chairman Alfred Dregger stated that the objective now is for announcements to become realities. One piece of progress is for reductions in short-range missiles to be announced as well. Here there is a Soviet superiority of 1,365 as opposed to 88 Western missiles. Volker Ruehe, deputy CDU-CSU Bundestag chairman, said that his group is waiting for the Soviet Union to agree to reliable monitoring of the disarmament steps. In the view of Horst Ehmke, SPD Bundestag group chairman, the Soviet Union is challenging German proponents of modernization in the West. If the announcement is not constructively taken up, "the interests of German policy will have further serious damage inflicted upon them again." FDP disarmament expert Olaf Feldmann expressed the view that a reaction is now due in the West. "NATO cannot be allowed to give the wrong answer to this convincing signal."

#### **Further on Official Response**

*AU2301171489 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER  
ALLGEMEINE in German 21 Jan 89 p 2*

["C.G." report: "Bonn Considers Moscow's Announcement a 'Positive Contribution' to Disarmament"]

[Text] Bonn, 20 January—The FRG Government has welcomed the announcement of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Vienna that the Soviet Union will unilaterally withdraw tactical nuclear weapons as a "positive contribution" to the efforts for arms control and disarmament. Chancellor Kohl said that with this the Soviet Union heeds the wish of the FRG Government and of other Western countries to reduce its considerable superiority concerning short-range nuclear weapons and to thus make negotiations on such systems easier. As an example of such behavior, Kohl referred to his decision of August 1987 to make a unilateral German contribution to disarmament by renouncing Pershing-IA missiles for the German Bundeswehr. FRG Foreign Minister Genscher spoke of considerable progress in many fields. In Vienna both in his speech at the end of the CSCE follow-up meeting and at a separate German-Soviet meeting, Shevardnadze announced that the withdrawal of Soviet units from the GDR, the CSSR, and Hungary will also include the withdrawal of the nuclear artillery and the corresponding short-range missiles belonging to

these troops. This is a favorable sign and meets a frequently voiced Western expectation, because the superiority of the East is particularly great in this field.

Genscher considered Shevardnadze's assessment of the Vienna conference as a "watershed in European development" as particularly important. The progress in the fields of human rights could bring about "important changes," Genscher said. The insight that a European peace can be established only on the basis of respect for human rights is gaining ground. "Europe has started moving," Genscher said. In the EC the development toward a European Union has started; however, Europe has also started moving because of Gorbachev's reform policy. The changes in the Soviet Union are examples to the other countries of the East. "Here a development has started, which cannot be avoided by anyone." Alluding to the GDR, Genscher added: "It can be delayed in one country or the other, it can be halted for a certain time, but the force of a development which is aimed at more freedom for the individual, at more pluralism in the society, more openness toward the inside and the outside, develops its own dynamism, which no one will be able to avoid." The example of the EC is attractive to other states in Europe. Economic openness is matched by cultural exchange, technological cooperation, and "constructive behavior" in disarmament. If Gorbachev had not followed his words with deeds, the Vienna agreements on human rights would not have been possible: "It is really a fact that the situation in Europe is receiving a new quality in a good sense," Genscher said.

In assessing the necessity for modernizing the short-range weapons in the West, there is no pressure of time, Genscher said referring to Kohl's statements. Now it is necessary to develop a concept for disarmament in the field of short-range missiles. FDP defense politician Feldmann added: "The reduction of Soviet short-range missiles and, in particular, the renunciation of modernization announced by Shevardnadze must not fall on deaf ears in the West." CDU Deputy Ruehe only assessed the Soviet announcements on conventional disarmament. The CDU/CSU expects the Soviet Union to agree with the West on mechanisms for reliable verification at the negotiations which will start in March, he said.

### **Press Reaction to Soviet Tactical Nuclear Arms Withdrawal Announcement**

*AU2001134089 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network  
in German 0605 GMT 20 Jan 89*

[From the press review]

[Text] Concerning USSR Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's declaration that the USSR will not only withdraw troops from the Warsaw Pact states until the end of April but also reduce the number of nuclear intermediate-range weapons, and dismantle nuclear artillery positions, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE comments: In connection with the objective to withdraw the total

foreign military presence from the territories of other countries, it becomes obvious at what this announcement is directed: Namely, driving the United States out of Western Europe and taking a step toward the denuclearization of Europe. The West has to reject this as long as the USSR does not change its conventional arms plan in the sense of a non-attack capability. This is to be discussed at a meeting in Vienna that will begin in March. The quick way in which Moscow is already now seeking to relate this to nuclear arms does not serve these talks. It is essentially directed at the public in the West, particularly in Germany, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE notes.

SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG from Munich writes: The opinion that with his unilateral troop reduction, Gorbachev only wanted to thwart the projected modernization of the West's short-range arsenals, an opinion that has been widely held in military-minded circles in the West, has never been a particularly sound argument and it is even less so at a moment in which the USSR is about to reduce—of its own accord—a potential, for which the West would have to compensate. What becomes discernible is not so much the tactics of obstructing a process. Rather one can discern the USSR's obvious desire to extend the talks on conventional arms control in Europe, which were recently concluded by the 35 CSCE states in Vienna, as soon as possible to the area of nuclear weapons, SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG notes.

BERLINER MORGENPOST writes: It sounds nice that Shevardnadze believes that the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting has shattered the Iron Curtain and weakened its rusty bars. However, who set that curtain up, after all? It is nice to hear Gorbachev making announcements that troops and weapons will be reduced, however, until now they are nothing else than mere declarations of intent. The military superiority of the East bloc continues. What is the West to make of the reduction of Soviet arms production, if it has been denied any access to statistics so far. All cuts the Soviets make need to be verified. Yet, where are the instruments for such control? BERLINER MORGENPOST asks.

FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU notes: The announcement of yet another Soviet advance concession in the field of disarmament—though it cannot be verified—is aimed at the very core of NATO's debate on modernization. Those forces, who with an advanced model of the Lance missile and other replacements wanted to fill an alleged gap, will find it even more difficult now to win public opinion for their plans. What will become of the modernization of the missiles in the future depends on the Western partners, Shevardnadze declared. This is a clear warning, FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU stressed.

NEUE OSNABRUECKER ZEITUNG holds the following view: Moscow's recent coup has been particularly successful. It hits NATO in its most sensible part: the

lack of decision in the question of modernizing short-range weapons. The FRG Government will again be in a dilemma. The hefty public reaction to Defense Minister Scholz's determined plea for this measure and Chancellor Kohl's indirect reluctance showed again last week how delicate this matter is for Bonn. However, at the same time it also shows that the chancellor was well-advised not to rush a decision. Thus, he has maintained his ability to act, NEUE OSNABRUECKER ZEITUNG stresses.

Now the comment in RHEINISCHE POST, which is published in Duesseldorf: Initially, some observers of the Soviet Union were inclined to regard Mikhail Gorbachev as nothing but a cunning propagandist—which he continues to be. However, he is showing his ever increasing efforts to jettison historical, political, and, above all, military superfluous ballast. He does it mainly from a utilitarian point of view. The USSR's super arms are widely responsible for the red superpower's economic grievance. It is full shelves and no longer missiles, by which the USSR citizens will judge success or failure of the new course. This was a quote from RHEINISCHE POST.

WESTDEUTSCHE ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG from Essen concludes: In a phase in which a new U.S. president is only beginning to familiarize himself with his new office, a signal from Moscow that confirms the current course of mutual understanding is highly welcome. However, the Soviet leader has by no means presented the West with an unselfish gift, but with a rather difficult one. Any promise of unilateral disarmament on the part of the USSR questions above all the attitude of the U.S. administration, which is able to envisage disarmament only from a position of strength. Once more, the West seems to leave the field of positive feeling to the Soviet leader without a fight. This was the comment in WESTDEUTSCHE ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG.

#### **Official Reaction to GDR Troop Reduction Announcement**

**Genscher: Proposal 'Important'**  
*LD2401184289 Hamburg DPA in German*  
1817 GMT 24 Jan 89

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has described the GDR's disarmament proposal as "an important step in the right direction, i.e. toward reducing superiorities." In an interview for RIAS TV [Radio in the American Sector] Genscher said today that this political signal confirms his own view "that the Warsaw Pact states are, like us, interested in achieving conventional stability at a lower level too." It is also a signal that the NATO concept (removing the capability for a surprise attack and a territory grabbing offensive on both sides) is being accepted in principle by the Warsaw Pact as well.

**Ost: Statement 'Constructive'**

*LD2401145289 Hamburg DPA in German  
1437 GMT 24 Jan 89*

[Text] Hamburg (DPA)—The announcement by GDR head of state and party leader Erich Honecker to reduce troops, tanks, and fighter aircraft, was welcomed on Tuesday by the federal government, NATO in Brussels and all Bonn parties as a step in the right direction.

The Federal Government considered Honecker's statement as an "important and constructive signal", government spokesman Friedhelm Ost said in Bonn. Just like a NATO spokesman, he referred to the great conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact. In the GDR alone more Soviet soldiers were stationed than the United States maintained in the whole of Western Europe. The GDR leadership should examine whether it was prepared to have the execution of its unilateral disarmament step checked.

**GREECE**

**Efforts To Solve Dispute on Excluding Areas from CSCE Control Underway**

*NC1101201289 Athens Domestic Service  
in Greek 1900 GMT 11 Jan 89*

[Text] Coordinated efforts are being exerted to avoid failure of the very important conference on the control and restriction of conventional forces within the framework of the CSCE. This statement by government spokesman Sotirios Kostopoulos came in response to a journalist's question on the government's position toward the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement that it would not make any concessions to Greece on the question of extending Turkish areas which are to be excluded from the measures of [words indistinct].

At the same time, the government spokesman categorically denied reports in today's press that NATO decided last August that the Mersin area would be excluded from such control. Kostopoulos stressed that there has never been such a decision.

**NETHERLANDS**

**Opposition to SNF Modernization Forming**

*52002405 Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT in Dutch  
3 Dec 88 p 19*

[Article by Jan Joost Lindner: "There Are Reasons for the Silence Concerning New Nuclear Tasks"]

[Text] The Hague—Last month, which was at one time designated for the deployment of 48 cruise missiles in Woensdrecht, the Interchurch Peace Council [IKV] once

again sounded the alarm. It hoped to arouse and motivate "a sleeping majority" and the political sphere to take action against a new nuclear escalation: NATO plans for short-range nuclear weapons. The IKV rang, but no one answered.

Mient-Jan Faber was once again sounding off on television after the meeting of NATO ministers in Scheveningen. Newspapers were swamped with letters from IKV workers and kindred spirits. But it was all to little avail. After the elimination of intermediate-range missiles in Europe (the INF accord), everyone apparently wants to enjoy some of the Gorbachev calm in East-West relations (aside from the indefatigable NATO arms buildup proponents).

Still, the issue is serious and important enough. The new nuclear round has the same agenda as the cruise missiles. However, the cruise missile was (just like the neutron bomb) a nice, unambiguous symbol of evil. At stake now are divergent systems to which, moreover, the misleading label "replacement" has been affixed.

The "Lance" is being replaced by an improved rocket launcher that can fire precision weapons with a much greater range. The F-16 airplanes are equipped with nuclear homing missiles instead of with bombs to be dropped on the battlefield; this too means a much greater range (as far as the limits of the scrapped intermediate-range missiles, and thus a nibble at the fringes of the INF accord), plus much greater precision. Unmistakably, these two "modernizations" constitute a very major expansion of nuclear arms.

Add to this new nuclear artillery. It is less far-reaching (short-range), but nonetheless objectionable, since fitting guns for nuclear as well as conventional tasks makes verification after a disarmament agreement considerably more difficult.

CDA defense specialist Frinking—never too nasty to embrace the olive branch—even favors having NATO unilaterally give up nuclear artillery (in the hope that the Warsaw Pact will follow.) The nuclear guns lower the "nuclear threshold," because lower commanders request their use earlier on, for example. In part because of this reasoning, Frinking appears to be strangely enchanted with the extension of the range of the F-16 and of the successor to the Lance. He calls this (with his feeling for euphemism) "maintaining the existing effort." He added in the Chamber: "It cannot be an expansion."

**Supporters**

Curious babbling, and it is not automatically accepted throughout CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] circles. Lubbers and others appear to be somewhat hesitant to adopt a position quickly, perhaps because of the danger of domestic polarization, but also in order to see which way the cards fall internationally. However, it is highly

unlikely that the CDA will arrive at a firm "no" to modernization. Van den Broek and the new minister of Defense, Bolkestein, have privately expressed their support for modernization.

Thus, the facts of the matter, combined with domestic policy considerations, mean that the IKV has every reason to sound the alarm. For Europe and the Netherlands, this is in fact another round similar to that with the cruise missiles. But this time, NATO is approaching the matter somewhat more cautiously. The decisionmaking process is moving at a stealthy pace. There is talk in IKV circles of "an underground political march."

Participating countries make progressively greater commitments every time. A "principle decision" must be made this spring, after which the Americans will be able to start production. The actual replacement in Europe will then take place "when necessary," which is a little worse than "if necessary." The vague term was used in part in order to temporarily pacify the Belgian social democrats, who have been in the government coalition for a while now.

NATO planners have learned from the dispute surrounding the cruise missiles that they must act with a little more subtlety. As long as there is no hard decision, there is less unrest. But the resolve felt is no less. This is intended to keep the United States solidly enough involved in European security while at the same time keeping strong pressure on the East Bloc in terms of conventional reductions.

### Arms Industry

Whoever has more arms has more to reduce: the age-old mechanism that simply led to more arms in the world prior to Gorbachev's breakthrough in 1986. American pressure on Europe to buy more weapons and pay more for its own security is no less great in this period of East-West detente. "Burden-sharing" is advocated more and more intensely as a means of taking care of the U.S. budget deficit without hurting the bread and butter of the arms industry, with its lobbyists. The implicit threat being the possibility of withdrawing U.S. troops from Europe.

In the recent "NATO test" (security policy is often a classroom), the Netherlands was mildly reprimanded because the three percent increase in defense spending did not go through. It was 0.6 percent for 1989 and 1990, which incidentally still means that the armed forces are a top priority in national politics. It is even doubtful whether the PVDA [Labor Party] will dare to propose "leftist cutbacks" in this area during the next cabinet term.

In the Ministry of Defense's new 10-year plan (Van Eekelen's last political breath in September), a more cheerful increase of two percent is assumed for after 1990, so that truly painful choices need not be made yet. This will be a tough job for the next formation, as will nuclear renovation.

The American arms industry still has no need whatsoever to slim down, despite the U.S. budget deficit and despite Gorbachev's willingness during negotiations to part with more conventional troops than the West. In NATO circles, a Western conventional reduction of no more than five percent is expected as the end result. Otherwise, the ring of defense would become too thin. A lavish overestimation of East European conventional superiority that scarcely takes qualitative considerations into account.

The NATO arms mechanism knows how to use its ways to survive the (in propagandistic terms detrimental) concessions offered by Gorbachev. Almost everything is proceeding along, only with a little more subtlety. The factory has to keep busy; there must be enough toys. There is little pressure (so far) in NATO to optimally profit from the current detente and period of good will by creating disarmament structures that could even survive a possible change of course in the USSR.

For instance, through simultaneous negotiations on conventional troops and short-range nuclear weapons, in conjunction with suspension of the NATO modernization. The argument that in this way NATO's defenses would become antiquated and weak is a fantasy of fear.

### Chances of Coming to Power

However, a strong movement for optimal disarmament is lacking. Social democrats in various countries, including the Netherlands, do not want to jeopardize their chances of coming to power through a new, fierce struggle on nuclear escalation. It is hoped that the FRG will take the lead, where the Christian Democrats—who are scarcely pacifists—seem to be more hesitant than their Dutch counterparts.

Naturally, German resistance within NATO is more effective than Dutch and Belgian. If the Germans hold up the process until after their elections (end of 1990), then the Belgian social democrats will, for the time being, not have to argue with Martens, and the PVDA will find it easier before that date to conclude a coalition agreement with the CDA (or perhaps even the VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy]).

This is undoubtedly the most important reason that the PVDA is reacting coolly to the appeals from the IKV, some of which have been very direct and virulent, such as the one by IKV workers on 8 November ("Open Forum" in DE VOLKSKRANT). It is also being reasoned that the PVDA does not want to end up too

quickly in a position of an unwavering "no" without having first developed alternatives with international kindred spirits. They are waiting quietly, fearful of an IKV clap on the shoulder.

In fact, a new nuclear round in NATO could seriously strain relations between the PVDA and potential coalition partners. Some PVDA people are finding a situation in which the rank and file is leaving a great deal up to the leadership—just so they make it into a coalition soon. The result could be that everything will be given away during coalition deliberations (half modernization is easier than the cruise missiles were at the time). And that only afterwards will hell break loose in the PVDA on the nuclear issue.

For Dutch opponents to a new round of armaments, however, it is risky to simply rely on parliamentary and

international tactics. Or to quietly hope that West German politics will allow the storm to blow over. On the other hand, in view of NATO wariness it is a little early to bring on the big guns as was the case with the struggle against the cruise missiles.

But the threat is too extensive and too real for Dutch apathy at this point. The calm has passed, and politicians must help the peace movement warn and motivate voters, in their electoral platforms as well. There is enough material to supplement the "no" to this nuclear escalation with constructive proposals for a more comprehensive disarmament policy.

There must be a strong political counterbalance to the (primarily American and British) forces in NATO that—regardless of the world situation—are simply unable to say goodbye to the arms race.

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